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INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 2011, as US warplanes participated in an
international campaign to protect civilians in Libya from the
wrath of Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, President Barack Obama
addressed the nation to explain America’s role in the Libyan
conflict.1 Inaction as atrocities that “stained the conscience of
the world” were being perpetrated by forces loyal to Libya’s
longtime tyrant would have betrayed both America’s values and
“our responsibilities to our fellow human beings,” the President
declared.2 Slightly over two years later, on August 26, 2013,
Secretary of State John Kerry decried the use of chemical
weapons against civilians in Syria, which “should shock the
conscience of the world,” and called on the international
community to “stand up to assure that there is accountability”
for this heinous crime.3 In the ensuing weeks, the world
witnessed an international diplomatic rollercoaster that brought
the United States to the brink of military action against the
Assad regime and compelled Syria to surrender its chemical
weapons stockpiles to international control.4
As is customary for Middle Eastern conflicts, the Libyan and
Syrian crises presented America and the world with innumerable
1. The international intervention to protect civilians in Libya was undertaken
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1973. See S.C. Res. 1973, para. 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
2. Barack Obama, President, United States, Remarks by the President in Address
to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
photos-and-video/video/2011/03/28/president-obama-s-speech-libya#transcript).
3. John Kerry, Secretary of State, United States, Remarks on Syria (Aug. 26, 2013),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213503.htm.
4. On September 27, 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2118
demanding the immediate destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and
promising punitive action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in case of noncompliance by any of the warring parties in the Syrian civil war. S.C. Res. 2118, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013).
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policy and legal challenges. Constitutional lawyers debated
whether America’s involvement in the Libyan civil war complied
with the War Powers Resolution,5 and pundits of every political
persuasion evaluated the Obama Administration’s posture
towards the Syrian civil war.6 Meanwhile, for some
commentators, a resurgent Russia actively protecting its regional
interests and allies was reminiscent of bygone Cold War days,7
while for others the American and European response to these
conflicts reflected the diminishing global influence of the west
and portended a drift towards a politically “anchorless world.”8
Beyond the particularities of these crises, the human
suffering they wrought, and the intricate questions of law and
policy they raised, for some scholars the fact that the
international community did not condone the terrorizing of
civilians by tyrannical regimes is symptomatic of a profound shift
in the nature of international law and the structure of
international relations. Regardless of the form and efficacy of
efforts to protect civilians in any particular conflict, the
emergence and increasing potency of the global concern for the
safety, security, and welfare of human beings everywhere,9
evinces a transformation in the dominant norms of international
affairs. The salient feature of this transformation, it is argued, is
the systematic humanization of international law, which makes
5. See, e.g., Trevor Morrison, Libya, ‘Hostilities’, The Office of Legal Counsel, and the
Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2011).
6. In support of President Obama’s policy regarding the Syrian civil war, see
Jeffrey Goldberg, From Iran To Syria, Obama’s Toughness Is Paying Off, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Sept. 20, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-20/from-iran-tosyria-obama-s-toughness-is-paying-off.html. For critical views of the Administration’s
positions, see Thom Shanker & Lauren D’Avolio, Former Defense Secretaries Criticize
Obama on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/
world/middleeast/gates-and-panetta-critical-of-obama-on-syria.html.
7. David Kenner, How Putin Turned Moscow Back into a Middle East Powerhouse,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/13/
how_putin_turned_moscow_back_into_a_middle_east_powerhouse?page=0,1.
8. Roger Cohen, An Anchorless World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/opinion/global/cohen-an-anchorless-world.html.
9. For example, speaking before the Security Council after the adoption of
Resolution 2118 on the situation in Syria, Secretary of State Kerry declared that
measures taken against the Assad regime were reflective of the fact that “[a]s a
community of nations, we reaffirm our responsibility to defend the defenseless.” John
Kerry, Secretary of State, United States, Remarks at the United Nations Security
Council (Sept. 27 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/
09/214890.htm).
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the overarching purposes of the global legal order the
upholding of human rights, the protection of human security,
and the fulfillment of human needs.10 In short, human beings
are being brought front and center, and thus displacing the
state from its long unrivaled position as the principal actor and
primary beneficiary of the legal regulation of international
relations.
This seismic shift from state-centrism to an individualfocused global legal order is said to have had a deep impact on
international law. Traditionally, the absence of either a central
lawmaker or enforcer led international relations theorists to
depict world affairs as an anarchic realm populated by coequal,
mutually suspicious, sovereign states.11 In this dangerous world
where survival and security are never guaranteed,12 the purpose
of international law was conceived as being limited to
minimizing violence and facilitating peaceful coexistence
between states.13 The humanization of international law,
however, is argued to be contributing to upending this image of
the society of states and laying the foundations for the
emergence of a global community of humankind. This is
occurring through a multifaceted process of hierarchization.
First, a set of predominantly humanitarian principles, drawn

10. See generally Theodor Meron, International Law in the Age of Human Rights:
General Course on Public International Law, 301 RECUEIL DES COURS 21 (2003). See also
infra Part I.
11. The canonical statement of this image of international relations is provided by
Kenneth Waltz, who explained that unlike domestic orders where governments execute
the lawmaking and law enforcement functions, “[t]he parts of international-political
systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all others.
None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are
decentralized and anarchic.” KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 88
(1979).
12. As Robert Jervis explains, the anarchical nature of international relations
causes international politics to degenerate into an “unrelenting struggle for survival,
advantage, and often dominance.” Robert Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation,
INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1999, at 42, 45.
13. This is why, as I detail below, scholars have identified what is called the
“international law of coexistence.” This form of legal regulation emerges because in
the absence of a central enforcer and in an environment where states are unsure about
the intentions of other states there is always a potential for conflict that limits the
possibilities for establishing and maintaining stable cooperative relations regulated by
law between states. See John Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions,
INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1994–95, at 5.
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from international human rights,14 humanitarian,15 and criminal
law,16 are recognized as occupying the normative apex of the
international legal order. Second, an array of global and
regional institutions are both challenging the state as the
primary actor in international affairs and overseeing the
implementation of these humanitarian principles. And third,
the myriad forces of globalization coupled with the enmeshment
of societies in webs of transnational relations heralds the
emergence of a post-national global social consciousness
predicated on common values and interests.17
Expectedly, the reverberations of this putative process,
frequently referred to as the constitutionalization of
international law, have been felt throughout the global legal
system. Many of the foundational principles of international law,
such as sovereignty, non-intervention, the juridical equality of
states, and state consent as the source of legal obligation are
either radically revised or wholly discarded. More profoundly,
the purpose underlying international law is said to have evolved
beyond the limited objective of regulating relations between
coequal sovereigns to protecting the rights, promoting the
interests and values, and fulfilling the needs of an emergent
global post-national community of humankind. This
reconstitution of the global order also brings, or at least aspires
to bring, inter-state competition and Great Power politics to an
end,18 and to subject, or at least aspires to subject, world affairs
to the rule of law.

14. Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International
Human Rights, 19 HUMAN RTS. Q. 703 (1997).
15. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
201, 205 (1979); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J.
INT’L L. 239 (2000); Gabriella Blum, The Individualization of War: From War To Policing in
the Regulation of Armed Conflict, in LAW AND WAR 48 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014).
16. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 35–
37 (2d ed. 2013).
17. See, e.g., Christian Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of
Mankind on the Eve of a New Century: General Course on Public International Law, 281
RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 42 (1999); see also Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law To
Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005).
18. Rosa Brooks, Transnational Security Advisors, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 6, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/transnational_security_advisors_
rice_power (arguing “that the age of great powers is coming to an end”).
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One area of international law, on which this Article focuses,
that is said to have evolved to reflect this ongoing process of
humanization is jus ad bellum.19 All laws serve certain social
purposes and policies,20 and in the case of jus ad bellum the rules
and institutions constituting this field of law were designed to
protect the security, independence, and territorial integrity of
states through minimizing inter-state violence.21 The
humanization of international law promises to overturn this
conception of the purpose of jus ad bellum. In a humanitarian
legal order serving the interests of a global community of
humankind, the principal purpose for which armed force may
be justifiably deployed is the protection of human, not state,
security.
At first glance, political and legal developments in the past
twenty years may appear to corroborate claims that the
humanization of international law is having a transformational
impact on jus ad bellum. Armed interventions to protect civilians
against mass atrocities in places like Iraq, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti,
Kosovo, and, most recently, Libya, in addition to efforts to end
civil strife and bring the perpetrators of crimes against civilian
populations to justice in war torn societies like the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, and now Syria, are all potentially
suggestive of a humanitarian shift in jus ad bellum and, more
broadly, in international law and politics.22 Moreover, the
meteoric rise of the Responsibility to Protect (“RtoP”) as a

19. Jus ad bellum is the area of international law that determines when states may
resort to armed force in international relations. By focusing exclusively on jus ad bellum,
I engage in an act of analytical isolation. This, as Frederick Schauer explains, means
that “studying a part of law does not deny the connections between that part and the
rest of law, and studying or even defining law as a whole does not deny the connections
between law and everything else.” Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV.
361, 364 (1985). Therefore, I realize that the conclusions reached in this Article about
jus ad bellum may not be completely valid for other fields of international law.
20. See Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003) (“The
Iowa law [enforcing a differential tax rate], like most laws, might predominantly serve
one general objective . . . .”); see also HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 159 (1958).
21. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, COLLECTIVE SECURITY 4 (2011).
22. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights, Humanitarian Crises, and Humanitarian
Intervention, 48 INT’L J. 607 (1993) (observing that “in fact, human rights, and issues of
humanitarian politics more generally, have achieved an international prominence at
least as great as at any other time in modern history”).

2014]

THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM

557

policy framework to prevent egregious human rights violations,23
and its subsequent invocation to justify a war waged to protect
civilians in Libya, may provide further evidence of the
emergence of a global community of humankind predicated on
common humanitarian values.24
In this Article, I challenge claims that the structure,
substance, and ultimately, the social values and policy purposes
underlying jus ad bellum are experiencing a paradigm shift. I
argue that this vital field of international law has not, as many
contend, undergone a process of humanization whereby its
overarching objective has become the promotion, protection,
and fulfillment of human security, rights, and interests.
Furthermore, recent interventions undertaken for humanitarian
purposes and doctrinal developments, such as the adoption of
RtoP, do not portend a future trajectory of humanization. To
the contrary, in this Article I show that the normative
architecture and institutional infrastructure of the system of
rules governing the resort to force continue to reflect statist, not
humanitarian, values, and that the dominant understanding of
security remains defined in terms of state, not human, security.
To make this point, I show that although a unique
opportunity arose to humanize jus ad bellum following the 1999
Kosovo War, the international community purposively elected to
keep the doctrinal and institutional components of jus ad bellum
intact. As discussed below, the intervention by the National
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) to protect civilians in
Kosovo was judged to be illegal because it was launched without
the requisite UN Security Council authorization, but was widely
lauded as legitimate because it served the humanitarian
objective of saving innocent civilians from mass atrocities. In
essence, the war had driven a wedge between a state-centric jus
ad bellum and a humanitarian legitimacy that justified overriding

23. Thomas G. Weiss, RtoP Alive and Well After Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 287
(2011) (noting that since the concept of genocide, “no idea has moved faster in the
international normative arena” than RtoP”).
24. See Stewart Patrick, A New Lease on Life for Humanitarianism, FOREIGN AFF.
(MAR. 24, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67674/stewart-patrick/a-newlease-on-life-for-humanitarianism?page=show; Hallie Ludsin, Returning Sovereignty to the
People, 46 VAND. J. TRANSN’L L. 97, 138–45 (2013).
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legal strictures to serve the higher purpose of protecting human
lives.
To bridge this gap between legality and legitimacy, various
justifications for waging humanitarian war were proposed in the
years following the Kosovo War. To varying degrees, these
justificatory techniques, which I catalogue in a typology I call
“The Legitimacies of Humanitarian War,” entailed revisiting the
existing doctrinal and institutional components of jus ad bellum
to bring them in line with humanitarian interests and values.
The purpose of this typology is not to recreate the tired debate
over the legality or legitimacy of the Kosovo War. Rather, the
objective is to illustrate to the reader that in the aftermath of
Kosovo a range of justifications emerged that, if they had
garnered sufficient international support, would have
overturned the statist structure and values of jus ad bellum. The
most prominent justification of humanitarian war to emerge
during this period was a variant of RtoP that I call RtoPHumanity’s Version, which proposed substantial revisions to the
rules and institutions of jus ad bellum.
Ultimately, however, the international community rejected
these legitimacies of humanitarian war. At the 2005 UN World
Summit, a version of RtoP that I call RtoP-Realpolitik prevailed
and jettisoned those features of RtoP-Humanity’s Version that
challenged the existing jus ad bellum scheme. RtoP-Realpolitik was
purposefully designed to make the legitimate use of force to
protect civilians wholly dependent on the consent of the
Security Council, which, as I argue below, is essentially a Great
Power concert. In other words, while protecting civilian
populations and safeguarding basic human rights have
undoubtedly become recognized as legitimate causes for armed
intervention by the international community, it remains that the
pursuit of these humanitarian objectives is doctrinally and
institutionally subordinate to the goal of protecting the essential
interests of the Great Powers and the maintenance of inter-state
peace. This means that the pursuit of humanitarian objectives
and the protection of human lives continues to function within
the bounds and limits of Great Power politics.
In a sense, therefore, the international response to the
Syrian civil war is unsurprising. By adopting RtoP-Realpolitik, the
international community effectively drew a line in the sand not
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at the perpetration of egregious crimes against civilians, whether
committed using conventional or non-conventional weapons,
but at the essential interests of the Great Powers. The 2005
World Summit practically prioritized the protection of Russian
and Chinese interests—and those of the other Great Powers—
over the humanitarian interest in protecting civilians from mass
atrocities. This indicates that the social objectives underlying jus
ad bellum continue to reflect the privileging of statist, not
humanist, values, which challenges suggestions that world
politics is witnessing the emergence of a global community of
humankind.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines the claim
that international law is undergoing a process of
constitutionalization that is laying the groundwork for the
emergence of a global community of humankind. In this Part, I
also outline the contours of what I call the ‘humanitarian thesis,’
which is the label I attach to claims that the international legal
order is experiencing a shift from state-centrism to a focus on
the rights, needs, and interests of individual human beings. Part
I also explains how the putative humanization of international
law challenges the norms and institutions of jus ad bellum, and
concludes with a discussion of how the Kosovo War provided an
opportunity to fundamentally revise the tenets of this field of
international law.
Part II is devoted to laying out my typology of justifications
for waging humanitarian war that emerged in the aftermath of
the Kosovo War, including a discussion of the content of RtoPHumanity’s Version. Finally, Part III demonstrates how the
international community ultimately rejected all these
justifications and adopted RtoP-Realpolitik, which preserved the
doctrinal and institutional structure of jus ad bellum and the
statist values underlying this legal regime.
I. HUMANITARIANISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
International legal scholarship is awash with talk about the
transformational changes that the field is experiencing.
International law, traditionally understood as the corpus of rules
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regulating relations between territorially distinct sovereign
states, is expanding exponentially.25 Symptoms of this growth are
abundant. Formerly unregulated areas of international affairs
have come within the ambit of international law,26 while
numerous actors, such as individuals, corporations, civil (and
uncivil) society, and international organizations, are becoming
increasingly integral to the international legal process, and at
times even challenging states as the principal actors in particular
fields.27
But international law is not only expanding horizontally to
include more issue-areas and actors. It is also growing vertically.
For decades, governments, courts, and scholars have
acknowledged the emergence of a normative hierarchy in
international law. Certain rules are considered to enjoy
superiority over and trump other rules. In addition, the practice
of international law is becoming progressively institutionalized.
Countless global and regional organizations and courts of both
general and issue-specific jurisdiction have been established to
manage vast swaths of international affairs.28
More profoundly, it is argued that this multidimensional
expansion of international law reflects a deeper transformation:
the purpose underlying the entire system has changed. As
discussed below, proponents of what I call the ‘humanitarian
25. See Anne Peters, The Growth of International Law between Globalization and the
Great Power, 8 AUSTRIAN REV INT’L & EUR. L. 109 (2003) (arguing that international law
is not only expanding, but exploding).
26. For example, international law today regulates access to and exploitation of
the global commons, which has also spurned the rapid evolution of international
environmental law. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2d ed. 2002). As space travel became relatively routine since the
mid-twentieth century, a series of multilateral treaties were contracted to ensure that
space exploration is undertaken for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of the entire
international community. See generally NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1999). Similarly, the scientific realization of the
negative impacts of degradation of biodiversity led to concerted international efforts to
protect the global ecosystem. See BIODIVERSITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Simone Bilderbeek ed., 1992).
27. See, e.g., Jose Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213
(2002) (discussing the role of international organizations in the negotiation and
conclusion of treaties). See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Reiner Hofmann ed., 1999).
28. See generally KALEVI HOLSTI, TAMING THE SOVEREIGNS: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2004) (examining the proliferation of international
institutions and their role in altering the dynamics of inter-state interactions).
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thesis’ maintain that an international legal order has emerged,
the objective of which is no longer limited to facilitating
interaction between juridically equal states, but that is
committed to the deeper social purpose of protecting the rights
and interests of human beings. This foundational
transformation, scholars argue, is subjecting international law to
the “pain of revolutionary change . . . . It is difficult to think of a
structural aspect of international law which is not in a state of
disorder, incoherence, and contention.”29
Jus ad bellum, like many other fields of international law, is
said to have felt the reverberations of this ‘revolution.’ Instead
of its traditional focus on minimizing inter-state violence,
maintaining state independence, and protecting the territorial
integrity of states, proponents of the humanitarian thesis argue
that jus ad bellum is evolving towards prioritizing the protection
of human security and human rights. To be fully appreciated,
however, these claims about the changing nature of jus ad bellum
should be placed within and viewed as part of the broader
debate about the ongoing transformation of the international
legal order. That is the purpose of this Part of the Article. It
begins by describing how the humanitarian thesis fits within
wider claims about the constitutionalization of international law.
This is followed by outlining the main contours of the
humanitarian thesis and a discussion of how the rules governing
the resort to force by states are affected by this putative rise of
humanitarianism as the overall animating purpose of
international law.
A. From International Unsociety to Global Community
In keeping with what is a scholarly tradition, this brief
overview of the evolving character of international law begins
with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The series of agreements
that concluded the Thirty Years War,30 collectively known as the
Peace of Westphalia, enjoy an almost mythical status in the

29. Philip Allott, Reconstituting Humanity–New International Law, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L.
219, 246 (1992).
30. The principal legal instruments that brought the Thirty Years War to an end
were the Treaty of Münster and Treaty of Osnabrück which were concluded in October
1648. See Peace of Westphalia, Oct. 10, 1648, 1 Parry 271; 1 Parry 119.
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history of both international law and international relations.31
These agreements are frequently cited as the foundation of
modern international law,32 and as the moment at which state
sovereignty became recognized as the ordering principle of
international relations.33
Since the Peace of Westphalia, diplomats and scholars alike
imagined a world populated by territorially distinct, juridically
equal, sovereign states. Two implications flow from this
imagined reality.34 First, a distinction was erected between the
internal domain and the external realm. In the former, a
hierarchical order existed in which an all-omnipotent sovereign
reigned supreme by monopolizing both law-making authority
and the legitimate use of force. This meant that sovereigns were
free to adopt whichever system of governance they wished and
were protected against outside interference in the internal
administration of their states. Externally, all sovereigns
coinhabited a horizontal plain in which none enjoyed inherent
supremacy over another.35 This meant that, in the absence of a
supreme sovereign capable of maintaining peace between the
sovereigns, an anarchic realm emerged,36 in which, to use
31. For example, Hans Morgenthau considered the legal principles agreed upon
in the Peace of Westphalia “the cornerstone of the modern state system.” HANS
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, 294 (6th ed. 1985).
32. LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xv (5th
ed. 2009); see also Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20
(1948); Sebastian Schmidt, To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of
Westphalia in International Relations Literature, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 601 (2011).
33. For a short study on the Peace of Westphalia and the roots of the concept of
sovereignty, see Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of
Sovereignty, 21 INT’L HIST. R. 569 (1999).
34. I call this world “imagined” because in reality world politics never
corroborated the theoretical postulates of the Westphalian order. States have
continuously either willingly accepted or grudgingly succumbed to various forms of
intervention in their internal affairs. Nonetheless, I use this simplistic conception of the
Westphalian order to illustrate its most salient features and to shed light on the role of
international law in this system. For a more realistic depiction of the Westphalian
order, see Stephen Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, INT’L SECURITY, Winter
1995/1996, at 115.
35. The clearest judicial expression of this image of the international order
appears in the decision in the Island of Palmas dispute. The arbitrator, Swiss jurist Max
Huber, observed: “Sovereignty in the relation between States signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the
exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state.” Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v.
Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932).
36. WALTZ, supra note 11, at 88–93.
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Thomas Hobbes’ graphic illustration, sovereigns are perpetually
locked “in the state and posture of gladiators, having their
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another, that is,
their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their
kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbors: which is a
posture of war.”37
The second implication of this Westphalian worldview
relates to the nature and function of international law. Because
this order lacked a centralized law-making authority capable of
promulgating laws binding its subjects, international law was
predicated on the consent of sovereign states.38 In other words,
states could not be bound to legal obligations absent their
voluntary consent.39 As to its function, in this insecure,
uncertain, and suspicious world populated by inherently
competitive states, it was unlikely that law would aspire to much
more than the circumscribed role of maintaining
communication and facilitating interaction between these
sovereign states. This legal system, aptly dubbed the
international law of coexistence,40 sought to merely “establish a
minimum order between antagonistic entities that challenge any
authority superior to themselves and which perceive their
relations as a ‘zero sum game’ where one’s gain is immediately
perceived as another’s loss.”41
The dominant view today, however, is that the reality of
global affairs mocks this Westphalian image.42 Most writings
37. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89–90 (Richard Tucker ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651).
38. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Aurther
Watts eds., 1992); see also JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 51–52 (Sir Humphrey
Waldock ed., 1963).
39. The canonical statement reflecting the theory that states could only bear legal
obligation to which they consented appears in the Lotus Case wherein the Permanent
Court of International Justice remarked that “International law governs relations
between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate
from their own free will . . . . Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed.” S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at I8
(Sept. 7).
40. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
60–61 (1964).
41. Georges Abi-Saab, Whither the International Community? 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 248,
251 (1998).
42. This prompted many authors to announce the emergence of a postWestphalian era. See, e.g., RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA?
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collectively refer to the historical processes that contributed to
this transformation of international relations under the broad
and often ill-defined banner of globalization.43 The impact of
the political, economic, social, and ideational changes that
occurred, especially since World War II,44 are considered to have
had the effect of revolutionary change on the structure of global
affairs.45 Coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union, the
processes of globalization are argued to have succeeded in
dethroning “the realist world order dominated by sovereign
states.”46
International law is also said to have evolved from the
minimalist law of coexistence prevalent under the classical
Westphalian image of world politics into a law designed to
promote the interests of a global community of humankind.
One storyline that traces this transformation of international law
is the claim that international law is undergoing a process of
constitutionalization.47 The salient theme running throughout
the constitutionalization literature and that captures its essence
is the hierarchization of international law.48 The constitutionalist
claim is predicated on the emergence of a tripartite normative,
valuative, and institutional hierarchy within the international
legal system, all of which indicate that a global community
(Trudy Jacobsen et al., eds., 2008); BEYOND WESTPHALIA? NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995).
43. DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-GLOBALIZATION:
BEYOND THE GREAT DIVIDE 2–3 (2d ed. 2009).
44. For a concise and holistic overview of the changes and developments that
brought about the phenomena that are frequently associated with globalization, see
DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE
414–52 (1999).
45. DANIEL PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY 2 (2001) (speaking of the
“overthrow” of the basic rules undergirding international relations).
46. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 303 (2002).
47. For an introductory survey of the debate, see TOWARDS WORLD
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ISSUES IN THE LEGAL ORDERING OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY
(Ronald. St. John Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 2005).
48. Jan Klabbers, Setting the Scene, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2009) (noting
that “the various manifestations of verticalization tend to stem from constitutionalist
sentiments”); see also Thomas Kleinlein, Between Myths and Norms: Constructivist
Constitutionalism and the Potential of Constitutional Principles in International Law, 81
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 79, 97 (2012) (“Hierarchization of public international law is
considered to be a crucial element of constitutionalism.”).
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governed by law is replacing the anarchic universe of coequal
sovereigns.49
The normative hierarchization of international law has
been the subject of much doctrinal debate.50 The centerpiece of
this normative growth is the recognition that certain principles,
referred to as either jus cogens or peremptory norms,51 constitute
supreme rules from which no derogation is permissible.52 While
no exhaustive list of peremptory norms has been compiled, the
prohibitions on aggression, slavery, genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity are frequently cited as constituting jus
cogens norms.53 The rationale underling recognizing these
principles as enjoying an elevated status within the international
legal system relates to the morally reprehensible nature of the
proscribed activities.54 Thus, “the higher purposes and values
represented by these superior norms, which are deemed nonderogable, constitute basic elements of a ‘world constitution’.”55
49. Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 51
(2006) (arguing that the international constitutional order consists of “an international
community, an international value system, and rudimentary structures for its
enforcement”).
50. For a brief introduction to the concept of normative hierarchy in
international law, see Dinah Shelton, International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 145 (Malcolm Evans ed., 3d ed. 2003).
51. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
52. Thus, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) observed that “[w]here
there is an apparent conflict between primary obligations, one of which arises for a
State directly under a peremptory norm of general international law, it is evident that
such an obligation must prevail.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001).
53. Id. Government statements, court decisions, and scholarly views have
identified a broad panoply of obligations and rights as possibly having attained the
status of jus cogens norms. These include: the right to self-determination, the
prohibitions on torture, forced labor, racial discrimination, and the principles equality
before the law and non-refoulment. See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50–66 (Vaughan Lowe ed., 2006).
54. For example, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht described obligations enjoying a higher
legal status as “expressive of rules of international morality.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, 155, UN Doc. A/CN.4.63 (1953 Vol. II).
Lord McNair also identified certain “rules of law and some principles of morality” that
actors may not agree to violate. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 213–14 (1961).
55. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, The Concept of International Community in
International Law: Theory and Reality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM
AND FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOR OF GERHARD HAFNER 93–94 (James
Crawford et al. eds., 2008). The body of higher international legal principles also
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Recognizing the normative hierarchization of international
law is doubly significant for the purposes of this Article. First,
proponents of the humanitarian thesis have underscored that
many peremptory norms are rights of individuals,56 which
demonstrates the priority human rights enjoy over other values
and
interests
in
international
law.57
Second,
the
constitutionalization of international law and the recognition of
certain principles as non-derogable overturn the Westphalian
worldview of an international law predicated on state-consent.
Indeed, a system where protecting “fundamental values is not to
be left to the free disposition of states individually or inter se but
is recognized and sanctioned by the law as a matter of concern
to all States”58 challenges the image of an order populated by
territorially disjoint, hermetic, and competing sovereigns.
Instead, what emerges is a global community bound by shared
values and interests that are embodied in legal instruments.59
Proponents of the constitutionalization of international law
argue that these values and interests constitute the ‘mortar’ that
holds this putative global community together.60 In today’s
includes obligations erga omnes, which are frequently presented as the opposite side of
the jus cogens coin. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens, and
Obligatio Egra Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 63, 72 (1996).
56. Karl Zemanek, The Unilateral Enforcement of International Obligations, 47 ZaöRV
32, 39 (1987) (arguing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents jus
cogens norms); see also Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1988-1989).
57. Anne Peters, Global Constitutionalism Revisited, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 39, 49–
50 (2005); see also Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 491, 494–95 (2008).
58. Bruno Simma, Bilateralism and Community Interest in the Law of State
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
SHABATI ROSENNE 823 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989).
59. Thomas Kleinlein, Summary: Constitutionalization in International Law, 231 MAXPLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT ZUR FORDERUNG DER WISSENSCHAFTEN E.V. 703, 709 (2012).
60. International constitutionalism is not the only school of thought that adopts
an image of the international legal system predicated on and designed to achieve
certain globally shared values. For example, the New Haven School, pioneered by Yale
Law School Professor Myres MacDougal, has consistently viewed international law as a
process that should be geared to the achievement of minimum world order and human
dignity. See Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew Willard, Policy Oriented Jurisprudence and
Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 316 (1999); see also Hengameh Saberi, Love it or Hate it, But For the Right
Reasons: Pragmatism and the New Haven School’s International Law of Human Dignity, 35 BC
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 59 (2012). Liberal internationalists, such as Thomas Franck,
Louis Henkin, and Anne-Marie Slaughter have also championed the cause of
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world, the argument goes, the members of an all-inclusive global
community61 have become cognizant of the fact that the
provision of certain non-excludable ‘public goods’ requires their
concerted cooperation.62 Examples of these include
international peace and security, the prevention of aggression,63
and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
which is dubbed “the noblest branch of international law,”64 and
proclaimed to be a foremost expression of globally valued
ideals.65 Ultimately, this interdependence and the global
commitment to these values and interests lead members of this
community to view their “existence, security, and well-being, but
also their identity as inexorably linked. Therefore, they share a
feeling of responsibility and have a common interest to protect
and promote the referent values. As a result, their modes of

understanding the international legal system as advancing liberal ideas that give pride
of place to basic human rights and democratic rule. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995); THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 240 (2000).
61. By all-inclusive, I wish to indicate that the members of this community are not
limited to states; quite to the contrary. Most authors emphasize that a global legal
community extends well beyond the society of sovereign states to include a host of
actors, both within and beyond the state including individuals, social and political
groups, civil society actors, and supra-national organizations. See Robert McCroquodale,
International Community and State Sovereignty: An Uneasy Symbiotic Relationship, in
TOWARDS AN ‘INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNITY’? THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (Colin Warbrick & Stephen Tierney
eds., 2006).
62. Georges Abi-Saab, Cours General de Driot International Public, 207 RECUEIL DES
COURS 1, 98–99 (1987-VII).
63. Santiago Villalpando, The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How
Community Interests Are Protected in International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 398 (2010).
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which was the first international legal instrument to
outlaw war, described the renunciation of war as ultimately necessary “to promote the
welfare of mankind.” General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, July 24, 1929, 46 Stat 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (Kellogg-Briand Pact).
64. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250
RECUEIL DES COURS 217, 242 (1994-VI).
65. For example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights underscores that
protection of “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the
world.” Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Similarly, the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights highlighted that “human rights is a matter of priority for the international
community.” World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Program of Action, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
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socialization in the international field are value-loaded and
purposeful.”66 Eventually, these values and interests seep into
the legal system and find expression in international legal
instruments, which in a curiously circular move, are then
frequently paraded as evidence of the emergence of a valueladen global community.67 The conclusion of innumerable
international legal instruments to enable an interdependent
global community to achieve these common values and
objectives “illustrates that there is a worldwide social
consciousness at work today . . . far beyond the traditional
rituals of governmental interaction.”68
As a testament to this emerging global consciousness,
constitutionalists point to the third manifestation of the
hierarchization of international law, which takes the form of the
emergence of a variety of international organizations to manage
global efforts to achieve this panoply of common values and
interests. The debate over the relocation of sovereign powers
and authorities from states to supra-national entities, whether
regional or global, enjoys considerable scholarly attention and is
too broad to be covered here.69 Two insights drawn from this
debate, however, are relevant for the purposes of this Article.
First, by transferring prerogatives traditionally associated with
66. Nicholas Tsagourias, International Community, Recognition of States, and Political
Cloning, in TOWARDS AN ‘INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COMMUNITY’? THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 211, 214–15.
67. See Santiago Villalpando, supra note 63, at 399–411. For a skeptical view
regarding the role of globally shared ‘values’ as the animating force behind many of
the international legal instruments that are frequently cited as evincing the emergence
of a global valuative community, see Jean d’Aspremont, The Foundations of the
International Legal Order, 18 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (2009).
68. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250
RECUEIL DES COURS 221, 234 (1994-VI); see also Dino Kritsiotis, The Power of International
Law as Language, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 397 (1997).
69. A collection of essays compiled by Neil Walker provides a useful introduction
and overview of this debate. RELOCATING SOVEREIGNTY (Neil Walker ed., 2006). The
terms ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalization’ have been used in different ways in
relation to international organizations. One way that these terms have been employed
is to refer to the study of the foundational treaties of international organizations and
their internal governance. Some scholars call this “micro-constitutionalism.” Another
way in which constitutionalism has been used in this context is to refer to the
burgeoning role supranational institutions perform in global governance which
challenges the traditional functions of nation-states. This form of constitutionalism is
SCHWOBEL,
GLOBAL
labeled
“macro-constitutionalism.”
See
CHRISTINE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (2011).

2014]

THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM

569

the nation-state to supra-national entities, the institutional
hierarchization of international law upends the image of an
anarchical horizontal plain of autonomous coequal sovereigns.70
The almost universally cited example of this form of institutional
hierarchization is the European Union, which is proclaimed to
have taken Europe into a post-national age.71 With its universal
membership, general jurisdiction, and centrality in world affairs,
the United Nations is also often presented as the legitimate
representative and agent of the international community.72
Second, in the constitutionalist narrative, supranational
institutions are not mere servants of their state-masters. Rather,
these institutions take on a life of their own and become
responsible for enforcing communal values and interests,
regardless of the narrower interests or occasionally myopic views
of any particular state or actor.73 Ultimately, the progressive
institutionalization of international affairs at both the regional
and global levels is considered no less than “the fulfillment of
the idea of community; it brings the community to perfection.”74
The cumulative effect of this tripartite normative, valuative,
and institutional hierarchization is that the world order is
70. Geir Ulfstein, Institutions and Competence, in THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 44 (highlighting that the “empowerment of
international organizations is not an ordinary delegation of powers. It means that
institutions other than the state can make decisions and adopt policies beyond the
control of each individual member state”).
71. A seminal volume in this regard is J.H.H. WEILER & MARLNE WIND, EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION BEYOND THE STATE (2003). Other scholars have likened the
new European political, legal, and institutional landscape to a new form of medievalism
marked my multiple layers of governance and authority. See Jorg Friedrichs, The
Meaning of New Medievalism, 7 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 475 (2001).
72. OTTO SPIJKERS, THE UNITED NATIONS, THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL VALUES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011); see Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529 (1998). For
another, more cautious view regarding the UN Charter as the constitution of the
international community, see James Crawford, The Charter of the United Nations as a
Constitution, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1, 10–16 (Hazel
Fox ed., 1997).
73. Anne Peters, Membership in the Global Constitutional Community, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 209 (“Here the
states have lost control to a significant degree, and the entities’ will does not simply
express the sum of the member states’ positions. The traditional image of the states as
masters of the treaties is inadequate to describe that complex reality.”).
74. P.H. Kooijmans, quoted in Don Greig, International Community, Interdependence,
and All That … Rhetorical Correctness?, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 583 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002).
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purportedly moving from an “international unsociety”75 to a
global community. In many constitutionalist narratives, this
community is not a community of states. Rather, it is a
“composite legal community of mankind.”76
B. The Humanitarian Telos of International Law
Given the implications that the hierarchization of
international law entails for the Westphalian state-system, it is no
wonder that human rights lawyers have been leading advocates
of the constitutionalization claim.77 International human rights
law is considered the foundation of a global constitutionalist
order, the overarching purpose of which is the promotion and
protection of individual rights and freedoms.78 The language
used to describe the impact of the rise of human rights is both
ostentatious and overwhelmingly celebratory.79 Human rights,
we are told, has “revolutionized the international system and
international law,”80 leading to no less than a “constitutive
change” in the international legal order,81 that has altered the
“deep structure of law in general.”82 Indeed, what in this Article
I am calling the humanitarian thesis is predicated on the claim
that the nature and function of international law have been
transformed. The international law of coexistence, principally
75. Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 31, 35 (1999).
76. Rao, supra note 55, at 93.
77. Thomas Cottier & Maya Hertig, The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism, 7
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 261, 271 (2003).
78. Martin Scheinin, Impact on the Law of Treaties, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (Menno Kamminga & Martin
Scheinin eds., 2009). The European Court of Human Rights is frequently cited as
corroborating the argument that human rights law embodies constitutional values. For
example, in one decision, the Court observed that it must “have regard to the special
character of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order for
the protection of individual human beings.” Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and
Others, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE5 (2001).
79. I say “overwhelmingly” and not unanimously because there are voices that
have chronicled what are presented as the downsides and negative unintended
consequences of the unprecedented international interest in human rights. See, e.g.,
DAVID KENNEDY, DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE (2005).
80. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”, 25 GA. J. INT’L AND COMP.
L. 31, 43-44 (1995–1996).
81. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 873 (1990).
82. Armin von Bogdandy, Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a
Proposal from Germany, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 223, 228 (2006).

2014]

THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM

571

committed to upholding the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and political independence of states, is progressively
metamorphosing into a global legal system dedicated to
upholding human values.83 This transformation, it is argued, is
“undeniable, irresistible, irreversible.”84
Although some writings advocating the constitutionalist and
humanitarian theses occasionally blur the line separating
descriptive claims about the existing state of international law
and normative prescriptions about their preferred vision of the
future for the global legal system,85 the theme underlying these
arguments is that the purpose, or telos, of contemporary
international law has become fulfilling the “needs and
aspirations of humankind.”86 This transformation is not
confined to the global legal system. The humanitarian thesis
suggests that the rise to preeminence of human rights law
reflects a reconceptualization of the entire architecture of
international relations. Because humanist considerations are
arguably reconstituting international politics, a new set of actors,
values, and institutions are touted as progressively occupying
center stage in global affairs.87
Beyond the legal and political realms, humanitarianism also
purports to be part of a profound process of global social
evolution. In a humanist legal order, the rights, freedoms, and
interests of all individuals are protected solely by virtue of their
humanity and regardless of their membership in any particular
social group, including states. This legal order is thus founded
on a cosmopolitan image of the world predicated on an
“association that binds the human race.”88 Other identities,
83. See Rafael Domingo, Gaius, Vattel, and the New Global Law Paradigm, 22 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 627, 640–41 (2011).
84. Henkin, supra note 80, at 35.
85. Benedict Kingsbury & Megan Donaldson, From Bilateralism to Publicness in
International Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 79 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (noting that the notion
of an international community is employed both as a descriptive device and as an
embodiment of a normative view).
86. Antonio Augusto Trinidade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a New
Jus Gentium, 316 RECUEIL DES COURS 83 (2005).
87. Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL
INT’L L. J. 335, 359 (2002).
88. RUTI TEITEL, HUMANITY’S LAW 195 (2011). For an introductory discussion
about the meaning and contours of cosmopolitanism as a philosophical position, see
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allegiances, or loyalties appear to be ultimately subordinated to
a universal cosmopolitan citizenship.89
The full impact and import of these changes in the
international legal order are not immediately apparent from the
almost messianic language chronicling and lauding the rise of
humanitarianism. The impact this shift on the foundations of
international law from statism to humanitarianism is reported to
have affected every branch and component of the global legal
system.90 First, the humanitarianism thesis echoes the broader
constitutionalist claim regarding the normative hierarchization
of international law. The recognition that certain principles,
most of which protect human rights, have attained the status of
jus cogens norms is assumed to have sounded “the death knell of
narrow bilateralism and sanctified egoism for the sake of
universal protection of certain fundamental norms relating, in
particular, to human rights.”91
Second, in a frontal assault on a central tenet of
international law, human rights principles are considered
invulnerable to state consent, long assumed to be the basis of
international legal obligation. This manifests itself in a variety of
ways. For example, human rights recognized as jus cogens norms
are argued to be binding on states regardless of their consent.92
Moreover, we are told that once states become parties to human
rights treaties they are unable to either withdraw from or

Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 312, 313 (Robert Goodin et al. eds., 2008) (noting that cosmopolitanism is
predicated on “assessments and prescriptions . . . based on taking equal account of the
interests of all human beings”).
89. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 167.
90. Menno Kamminga, Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law
on General International Law, in THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 78, at 4 (indicating that “the impact of international
human rights law on general international law is highly desirable in order to soften the
international legal order’s predominantly state-centered nature”). Similarly, Michael
Reisman considers these ongoing changes in international law to have caused a
“qualitative change in virtually every component” of the legal system. Reisman, supra
note 81, at 872.
91. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 413, 432 (1983).
92. Evan Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J.
INT’L L. 331, 336 (2009).
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renounce these instruments,93 which departs from the
assumption underlying the entire corpus of the law of treaties
that states are bound to agreements only by virtue of their
consent.94 Furthermore, the rules governing state reservations
against the provisions of treaties are deemed to be inoperable in
relation to human rights instruments.95 Recent scholarly opinion
and state practice also suggests that human rights treaties are
unaffected by state secession.96 This multifaceted demotion of
state consent, a premier feature of the anarchical order of
coequal sovereigns, is considered an indelible confirmation of
the shift towards “a shared humanity-based normativity.”97
Having deposed state consent, the humanitarian thesis then
moves to overthrow international law’s most hallowed principle:

93. The Human Rights Committee, established to monitor state compliance with
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), opined that:
[T]he Covenant is not the type of treaty which, by its nature, implies a right
of denunciation . . . the Covenant codifies in treaty form the universal human
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . [a]s such,
the Covenant does not have a temporary character typical of treaties where a
right of denunciation is deemed to be admitted.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 26: Continuity
of Obligations, U.N. DOC. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Aug 12, 1997).
94. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2d ed. 2007) (“To
consent to be bound is therefore the most significant, positive act which a state can take
in relation to any treaty.”).
95. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) outlines the rules
allowing states to enter reservations to multilateral treaties, presumably including
human rights treaties. See Vienna Convention, supra note 51, arts. 19–23. The Human
Right Committee, however, declared that these rules were inapplicable to the ICCPR.
In 1994, the Committee concluded that the provisions of the VCLT:
[O]n the role of State objections in relation to reservations are inappropriate
to address the problem of reservations to human rights treaties. Such treaties,
and the Covenant specifically, are not a web of inter-State exchanges of
mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals with rights.
The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place . . . . It necessarily falls to
the Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with
the object and purpose of the Covenant.
Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 24: Issues
Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. DOC.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (11 Apr. 1994).
96. Malcolm Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 5 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 34, 84 (1994);
Florintino Ruiz Ruiz, The Succession of States in Universal Treaties on the Protection of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 7 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 42, 42–43 (2003).
97. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 172.
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state sovereignty. Contemporary attacks on sovereignty98 as an
ordering principle of international relations came from many
quarters. It appeared, especially in the post-Cold War years, as if
forces from within and without the state conspired to
deconstruct sovereignty.99 Separatist movements, sub-national
groups, ethnic minorities, and tribes in various countries
challenged the supremacy of national governments leading in
many cases to the disintegration of formerly sovereign states.
Meanwhile, proponents of trade liberalization viewed
sovereignty with its, at least theoretically, impregnable borders
as antithetical to the ideal of open global markets. Similarly,
climate change, avian flu, terrorism, financial crises, and
innumerable other phenomena all ridiculed the image of a
world of territorially disjointed, mutually exclusive states. In
short, “sovereignty is no longer sovereign; the world has
outgrown it.”100
Advocates of the humanitarian thesis have been particularly
aggressive in their criticism of sovereignty. So much so that the
concept is treated as an epithet to be referred to as “the ‘S’
word” and is described as “a mistake, an illegitimate
offspring.”101 Disdain of sovereignty by proponents of
humanitarianism is understandable. The principal implication
of sovereignty, as understood in classical international law, is
that states are immune to outside intervention in their internal

98. Many scholars of international law exhibited varying degrees of discomfort
regarding sovereignty long before the emergence of human rights as a subfield of
international law. See Martti Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters: International Relations as
New Natural Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 395, 403 (2009) (“From the late 19th century
onwards, international lawyers have been critics of sovereignty as egoism, arbitrariness,
and absolute power.”).
99. Even the way the word ‘state’ is written attests to its receding role. Previously,
as a sign of reverence to the sole subject of international law, scholars routinely
capitalized the ‘S’ in State, as if writing of a deity! Today, words like state, government,
and contracting parties, are written in small caps. Notable exceptions to this trend are
judgments of the International Court of Justice.
100. Thomas Weiss & Jarat Chopra, Sovereignty Under Siege: From Intervention to
Humanitarian Space, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION, supra note 42, at 87, 97.
101. Louis Henkin, The ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights Et
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1999).
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affairs,102 including how governments treated their own citizens.
The emergence and exponential growth of human rights law
since World War II, however, pierced the veil of sovereignty.103
International law was now regulating the relationship between
governments and individuals within their jurisdiction. This
expansion of the domestic reach of international law prompted
observers to announce that the statist version of sovereignty,
with its emphasis on non-intervention, had finally been
displaced.
Instead, a humanitarian conception of sovereignty was
emerging,104 whereby the protection of individual rights and
freedoms became the justification and rationale of
sovereignty.105 This reimagined sovereignty is ultimately defined
as “the legal principle that human rights, interests, needs, and
security must be respected and promoted, and that this
humanistic principle is also the telos of the international legal
system.”106
Having disarmed sovereignty, humanitarianism then
challenges another foundational assumption of international
law that all states are juridically equal. In a humanitarian world
order, “the autonomy of states is not intrinsically a human
value.”107 Autonomy and the continued exercise of the privileges
of sovereignty are conditional on a state’s promotion and
102. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 254 (1st ed. 1966)
(describing the principle of the non-intervention in the internal affairs of states as “a
master principle” of international law).
103. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 337 (1997) (depicting the criminalization
of crimes against humanity and the prosecutions of former Nazi officials at Nuremburg
as “piercing the veil of sovereignty”).
104. In its widely cited inaugural decision in the Tadic case, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) observed: “A State-sovereigntyoriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented
approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est
(all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in the
international community as well.” Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
105. Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict, in TOWARDS AN ‘INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL COMMUNITY’? THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 131, 160–61; see also Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of
Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (London), Sept. 18, 1999, at 49.
106. Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and  of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513,
514 (2009).
107. Henkin, supra note 101, at 12.
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protection of human rights. Some scholars go a step further and
suggest that international law, especially in the post-Cold War
era, recognizes liberal democracy as the premier system of
government.108 Therefore, humanitarians argue that states that
are either unwilling or incapable of protecting human rights, or,
in some views, those which fail to progress towards liberal
democracy, could become prone to foreign intervention to
protect individual rights and promote democracy.109 In short,
international law simply would neither recognize nor protect
abusive or illiberal states.
The ambition of both the humanitarian thesis and the
broader constitutionalist project is far more profound than
merely challenging tenets of international law such as
sovereignty, consent, and the equality of states. These
intellectual endeavors are engaged in a bid to restructure
international relations and transform global politics. So potent
is this putative multifaceted hierarchization of international law
and the humanitarian values underlying it that it is capable of
reconstituting the international community.110 This, it is argued,
warrants reversing Cicero’s idiom ubi soceitas; ibi jus into ibi ius
gentium; ubi soceitas.111
In other words, the humanitarian international legal order
is argued to be capable of vanquishing the world of sovereign
states and giving birth to a universal community of humankind.
As part of this process, the emergent humanist legal order
remodels how foreign policy is crafted and reorients the
108. Niels Petersen, The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law, 34
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 33 (2008). On this basis, some scholars have proposed
differentiating between liberal and illiberal states, with international law granting the
former the right to intervene in the affairs of the latter to promote democracy and
human rights. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal
States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 516 (1995). The idea of differentiating between states on
the basis of the nature of their domestic system was also famously adopted by the
leading political philosopher John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES
(1999).
109. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 214; see also Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 91 (1992); FERNANDO TESON, A
PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39–66 (1998).
110. TESON, supra note 109, at 39.
111. James Crawford, Responsibility for Breaches of Communitarian Norms: An
Appraisal of Article 48 of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUDGE
BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 224, 240.

2014]

THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM

577

purposes it serves.112 State interests, national security, global
strategy, and the pursuit of power, long considered language
and logic of international relations, are being replaced by “a
depoliticized legalist language of rights and wrongs, duties and
obligations.”113 In the place of the egoism of raison d’état, the
humanitarian thesis imagines an international community
committed to the pursuit of collectively shared humanistic
values.114 This dual rise of humanitarianism and expunging of
politics from global affairs ultimately emancipates humanity
from the anarchical Hobbesian state of nature and establishes a
hierarchical cosmopolitan order.115
C. Humanitarianism and the Transformation of Jus ad Bellum: From
State Security to Human Security
One area where the impact of the newly emergent
humanist telos of international law is said to have been
particularly patent is jus ad bellum. The rules governing the
resort to force by states in international relations are argued to
have changed dramatically to permit armed intervention to
protect civilians against gross human rights abuses. This, many
advocates of the humanitarian thesis contend, demonstrates the
depth of the ongoing humanization of the international legal
system. Because waging war has long been considered the ultima
ratio regum of states in the pursuit of their interests,116 the
adoption of the protection of human beings as an overarching

112. Teitel, supra note 87, at 356.
113. Id. at 372 (emphasis added); see also Paul Kahn, Speaking Law to Power:
Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9
(2000) (“International law does not see this world of politics based on power, threat,
and sacrifice. Indeed, its contemporary ambition is to overcome this world, to achieve a
fundamentally depoliticized global order.”).
114. See Ian Ward, The End of Sovereignty and the New Humanism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
2091, 2106 (2003) (suggesting that “in the place of the tired notions of state
sovereignty, the new world order must embrace once again the idea of a ius humanitatis,
a conception of law and justice that is able to “transcend jurisdictions and
cultures . . .’”).
115. See von Bogdandy, supra note 82, at 240.
116. The phrase ultima ratio regum means: “the final argument of Kings,” and has
been used to indicate that the resort to war is the ultimate weapons in the toolbox of
sovereigns in their interactions in an anarchical world order. See e.g., Hans
Morgenthau, The Machiavellian Utopia, 55 ETHICS 145, 146 (1945).
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purpose of war would provide irrefutable evidence that human
ideals are indeed displacing statist values in world affairs.
Before examining the humanitarianism claim about the
transformation of jus ad bellum, it is necessary to illustrate the
state-centric nature of jus ad bellum that the humanization of
international law is said to have transformed. Because this
Article is obviously not intended as a treatise on jus ad bellum,
discussion will be limited to those features of this system that are
relevant to the question of the use of force to protect
individuals.117
The current legal regime governing the resort to force by
states is principally embodied in the UN Charter.118 Having
emerged from the horrors of World War II, the victorious allies
set out to reconstruct the global security architecture. The
centerpiece of this reconstituted world order was to be the UN
Charter, which was drafted against the background of the stillrecent memory of the demise of the League of Nations that was
established to ensure that World War I was to be ‘the war to end
all wars.’ “The preoccupation of the United Nations founders
was with State security. When they spoke of creating a new
system of collective security they meant it in the traditional
military sense: a system in which States join together and pledge
that aggression against one is aggression against all . . . .”119 It is,
117. Countless volumes have been authored on jus ad bellum. Despite being
published over forty years ago, I believe that the locus classicus in this area remains, IAN
BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963), especially in
that it provides a rich historical background to the UN Charter scheme on the use of
force. For recent surveys of the field, see YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELFDEFENCE (5th ed. 2011); OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR (Emmanuelle
Jouannet ed., Christopher Sutcliffe trans., 2010); MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (2009); CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (Malcolm D. Evans & Phoebe N.
Okowa eds., 3d ed. 2008); and, slightly older, ANTHONY AREND & ROBERT BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, (1993).
118. I say “principally” because a number of documents drafted prior to 1945
constitute the foundation on which the UN Charter is predicated. The most significant
of these is the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, otherwise known as the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was the first
international legal instrument to unequivocally outlaw the resort to war. See Quincy
Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 370 (1953).
119. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report
of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Synopsis, U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter UNSG High-Level Panel Report]. I should note, however,
that many international relations scholars understand the term “collective security” to
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therefore, unsurprising that the overarching purpose of the
United Nations was originally conceived of as the maintenance
of international peace and security,120 where peace was
understood as “a condition of absence of force in the relations
among states.”121
The primacy of inter-state peace among the purposes of the
United Nations finds its ultimate expression in article 2(4) of
the Charter, which prohibits the resort to force by states.122 This
principle is considered a jus cogens norm,123 and has been
described as a “fundamental or cardinal principal” of
international law,124 and as the “cornerstone of peace.”125 The
Charter lists three exceptions to this principle. First, all states
may resort to armed force in self-defense.126 Second, UN
members were permitted to use force against any of the World
War II Axis powers.127 Third, the Security Council may resort to
force to confront threats to, or breaches of, the peace, or acts of
aggression.128

denote a system whereby an act of aggression will be confronted by an automatic and
collective response. See e.g., Mearsheimer, supra note 13. Judged by that standard, the
UN Charter scheme, which I discuss in detail below, would not qualify as a collective
security system especially in that it lacks any stipulation for an automatic response to
acts of aggression.
120. See Rudiger Wolfrum, Article 1, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 39, 42 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
121. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 19 (1964).
122. Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.” See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
123. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 153 (June 27) (separate opinion of President Nagendra Singh); see
also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Reports 136, 254 (July 9) (separate opinion of
Judge Nabil Elaraby).
124. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 90 (June 27).
125. C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 492 (1952).
126. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
127. See U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1, and art. 107. These provisions are
unanimously understood to be dead letter law, especially since all of the Axis powers
have joined the UN, and some are even considered leading candidates to join the
Security Council as Permanent Members.
128. Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 120, at 112, 125.
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It appears, therefore, that the defining feature of the
Charter-based jus ad bellum scheme is the prohibition of the
unilateral use of force, except in self-defense, and the
identification of the Security Council as the sole authority
responsible for deploying armed force to protect international
peace and security.129 This historically unprecedented power
vested in the institution of the Security Council warrants a closer
look at its composition and functions.130
As is well known, the Security Council is composed of
fifteen states. Ten of these are elected to two-year terms, while
five states enjoy permanent membership.131 In addition, the
“P5,” as the permanent members are dubbed in UN-speak, wield
a veto that enables them to block any decision of the Council on
substantive matters, the most important of which is the resort to
armed force.132 The privileges bestowed onto the P5 reflect the
pragmatism of the drafters of the UN Charter and their desire to
avoid replicating the institutional deformities of the League of
Nations. Principal among these was the absence of leading states
that either never joined the League, most notably the United
States, or that acquired membership late in its short life, such as
the Soviet Union. In addition, decisions of the League Council,
the precursor of the Security Council, could only be taken by
unanimity. Both of these elements severely hindered the
effectiveness of the League. Without Great Powers capable of
enforcing its decisions and crippled by the need to secure

129. Christine Gray, The Charter Limitations on the Use of Force, in THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR 86 (Vaughan Lowe et. al. eds., 2008). Kelsen
confirms this by noting that the striking features of the UN Charter is that the resort to
armed force “can be taken only by a central organ, the Security Council, and only after
the Council has determined the existence of a threat to, or breach of, the peace.”
KELSEN, supra note 121, at 725.
130. EDWARD LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL 3 (Thomas G. Weiss & Rorden
Wilkinson eds., 2006) (noting that the Security Council’s “enforcement authority is
unique in the history of inter-governmental cooperation”).
131. The P5 are: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The remaining seats are divided among the regional groupings within the
United Nations in the following manner: Africa and Asia: five seats, Western Europe
and Other States: two seats, Latin America and the Caribbean: two seats, and Eastern
Europe: one seat. See David Malone, Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on
the UN Security Council, 6 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 4-5 (2000).
132. See U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
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unanimity among its members, the League quickly lost
credibility, especially in the eyes of the revisionist Axis powers.133
Therefore, for the founders of the United Nations, strong
incentives had to be provided for the Great Powers to remain
within the new world organization.134 These took the form of the
permanent membership on the Security Council coupled with
the guarantee, through the veto, that the United Nations would
never jeopardize the security or interests of these states.135
“Great Power status in the United Nations thus meant dominion
over small powers . . . . The veto blocked UN action in any
situation contrary to a Great Power’s interest, including conflicts
with other Great Powers.”136
In addition to the privileges enjoyed by the P5, the UN
Charter grants the Security Council unmatched institutional
powers. Article 24 of the Charter entrusts the Council with the
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security,”137 which, given that the United Nations was
principally intended to preserve inter-state peace, means that
the Council occupies the very core of the UN system. To enable
it to fulfill its responsibilities, the Charter endows the Council
with a unique panoply of prerogatives. First, unlike any other
UN organ, decisions adopted by the Council are obligatory on
all member states.138 Second, and more importantly, pursuant to

133. Leland Goodrich, From League of Nations to United Nations, 1 INT’L ORG. 3, 9–
10 (1947) (describing how the unanimity rule, among other factors, rendered the
League incapable of taking action against either Japan following its invasion of
Manchuria or Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia).
134. Vaughan Lowe et. al, Introduction, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL AND WAR supra note 129, at 12 (“The Charter as a whole was drawn up with
the central aim of ensuring that the major powers would be willing to join, and remain
in, the organization.”).
135. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN 8–32 (2006).
136. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations
Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 384
(1994).
137. The use of the word “primary” in article 24 of the Charter led the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) to observe that: “The responsibility conferred is
‘primary’, not exclusive. . . . It is only the Security Council which can require
enforcement by coercive action against an aggressor. The Charter makes it abundantly
clear, however, that the General Assembly is also to be concerned with international
peace and security.” Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (Article 17, Paragraph 2,
of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, at 163 (Jul. 20).
138. U.N. Charter art. 25.
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Chapter VII of the Charter the Security Council may resort to
enforcement measures, which is the codeword denoting a range
of options including armed force, to maintain international
peace and security.
As a prerequisite to resorting to these measures the Council
should “determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”139 The Charter,
however, does not define what constitutes a threat to or breach
of the peace or an act of aggression, thereby granting the
Council unlimited flexibility in identifying any particular crisis,
situation, or incident as amounting to a threat or breach of the
peace or act of aggression.140 Moreover, even if the Council were
to identify a threat to or breach of the peace or act of
aggression, it is under no obligation to take any action to
confront such a situation.141 In a further show of its broad
margin of appreciation, should the Security Council decide to
take enforcement action, it is free to determine those measures
that it considers adequate to respond to the particular situation
before it.
In other words, for the Security Council, the “freedom to
decide when to apply coercive measures is matched by an equal
discretion as to what measures may be taken . . . . Its discretion,
thus, is virtually absolute in choosing the type of coercion which
it considers best adapted to meet the situation at hand.”142 It
should also be noted that, because the Charter prohibits the
unilateral use of force, the mere identification by the Council of
a threat to or breach of the peace or act of aggression does not
constitute a license for states to use force to confront these
situations. Until the Council authorizes the deployment of force,

139. U.N. Charter art. 39.
140. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 108
(1991) (describing the powers and authority of the Council in this regard as “virtually
unlimited”).
141. See KELSEN, supra note 121, at 734. (“[I]t is not possible to maintain that it
[the Security Council] is under an obligation to take enforcement measures after it has
determined the existence of a threat to, or breach of, the peace.”).
142. Grayson Kirk, The Enforcement of Security, 55 YALE L.J. 1081, 1089 (1946).
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“enforcement action by individual States on behalf of the
United Nations is unlawful.”143
A careful reading of the Charter also reveals that the
prerogatives of the Security Council do not stop at the
international boundaries of states. Article 39, not
unintentionally, omits the word “international.” This indicates
that threats to or breaches of the peace that could potentially
unleash Council-authorized enforcement measures need not
relate to inter-state tensions or conflicts.144 Human rights abuses,
civil strife, non-international armed conflicts, violations of
humanitarian law occurring during such conflicts, or any other
domestic situation, even if not involving any acts of violence,
were all considered since the inception of the United Nations as
possibly warranting Security Council intervention, including
through the use of force.145 Article 2(7) of the Charter confirms
the power of the Council to authorize force in response to any
occurrence inside a member state that in the Council’s view
threatens or breaches the peace.146 “This provision enables the
[Council] to tackle root causes of a conflict before it reaches
dimensions which are harder or impossible to manage.”147
The exceptional privileges of the P5 and the boundless
powers of the Security Council were not uncontroversial at the
San Francisco conference during which the UN Charter was
finalized. A number of countries decried the inequity of the veto
and warned that requiring P5 unanimity or at least their
acquiescence meant that the Security Council could be
incapacitated when it was most needed.148 These warnings
143. Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 120, at 701, 713–14.
144. See KELSEN, supra note 121, at 731.
145. See Frowein & Krisch, supra note 143, at 721; see also KELSEN, supra note 121,
at 19 (“However, a civil war, as any other situation within a state, may be interpreted by
the competent organ of the United Nations as a threat to international peace . . . .”).
146. “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
147. Georg Nolte, Commentary on Article 2(7), in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 120, at 148, 168–69.
148. See LUCK, supra note 130, at 13–15.
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proved prophetic given the innumerable situations during
which the Council stood paralyzed in the midst of political and
humanitarian crises, only the latest of which is the Syrian civil
war. Therefore, some delegations suggested either eliminating
the veto or limiting its use,149 while others proposed setting
guidelines to direct the Council’s decisions.150 Calls were also
made to define specific circumstances, especially aggression, in
which it would be obligatory for the Council to forcefully
intervene.151 The P5, covetous of their unrivaled influence and
standing in the United Nations, were implacable. Ideas
circumscribing their powers or limiting the Council’s flexibility
were rejected. Ultimately, therefore, the United Nations, or at
least its collective security scheme, had transformed “a wartime
alliance into a big power oligarchy.”152
The humanitarian thesis challenges this vintage-1945
Charter scheme. Jus ad bellum, at least as conceived in the
aftermath of World War II, is the quintessential expression of
the international law of coexistence.153 Its purpose is minimizing
violence in international relations by outlawing armed force
between territorially disjointed and mutually exclusive sovereign
states. The emergence, however, of a global community of
humankind, driven by the hierarchization of international law
and the rise to preeminence of human rights, arguably
undermines the premise underlying jus ad bellum.
Humanitarianism “reconceives security in terms of the
protection and preservation of persons and peoples. Once the
relevant subjects and goals in the international realm are
reconceived in this way, the meaning and challenges of security
in both war and peacetime become blurred.”154 In other words,
149. See DAVID BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL 23–24 (2009).
150. Edward Luck, A Council for All Seasons: The Creation of the Security Council and
its Relevance Today, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note
129, at 61, 63, 67.
151. Id. at 69.
152. Id. at 63; see also Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, Precommitment Regimes
for Intervention: Supplementing the Security Council, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 41, 47 (2011)
(noting that “the UN Charter provides no checks on the Security Council: there are no
constitutional constraints on what it can do. Indeed, when the Security Council acts,
with the approval of all Great Powers and sufficient other support, its legal powers are
essentially unlimited”).
153. ABI-SAAB, supra note 41, at 254.
154. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 13.
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humanitarianism dethrones the sovereign state as the
beneficiary of the global security architecture, and identifies the
protection of the interests, rights, and freedoms of human
beings as the objective of security policy.155
This shift from state security to human security calls into
question many of the classical features of both war and security,
and challenges key doctrinal and institutional components of
post-World War II jus ad bellum. In 1945, just as it had been for
centuries, security was imagined as intrinsically intertwined with
geography. National borders were considered sacrosanct
dividers between a domestic domain and an external realm.
Sources of insecurity, it was thought, primarily emanated from
the latter. Thus, threats emerged if an adversary amassed troops
along a shared border, when a neighbor accumulated weapons
at an alarming rate, or if enemies threatened strategically
valuable territory.156 Bringing human beings front and center,
however, fundamentally revises the scope and content of
‘security.’ An assortment of issues, all of which affect the quality
155. Hisashi Owada, Human Security and International Law, in FROM BILATERALISM
COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at
505, 506 (“Human security is often distinguished from traditional security doctrines on
the basis that it makes individuals the central concern of security policy.”). Human
security was not developed as a foil against state security solely in the area of jus ad
bellum. Proponents of human security imagine the concept as a paradigm shift affecting
how a broad variety of issues should be dealt with. The 1994 United Nations
Development Programme (“UNDP”) Human Development Report, considered a
groundbreaking document in the elaboration of the content of human security,
explained that the concept underlying this idea is that security should be reframed
“from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s
security.” The report goes on to identify to following areas of security that should be
reexamined in light of the rights and needs of individual human beings as opposed to
the interests of states. These areas are: (1) Economic security, (2) Food security, (3)
Health security, (4) Environmental Security, (5) Personal security, (6) Community
security, and (7) Political Security. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, NEW DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY 22–47 (1994); see also
Roland Paris, Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, INT’L SECURITY, FALL 2001, at
87; Astri Suhrke, Human Security and the Interests of States, 30 SECURITY DIALOGUE 265
(1999).
156. Edward Newman, Human Security and Constructivism, 2 INT’L STUD. PERSP.
239, 240 (2001) (“International security has traditionally been defined as military
defense of territory. . . . National security therefore is the imperative of defending
territory against, and deterring, ‘“external’” military threats.”). See generally Helga
Haftendorn, The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International
Security, 35 INT’L STUD. Q. 3, 5–6 (1991) (describing the emergence and meaning of
“national security”).
TO

586 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:551
of life of individuals, become potential sources of insecurity and
gain a newfound urgency and importance.157 Among the
especially prominent components of human security are the
protection and promotion of human rights and the
advancement of democracy.158 For proponents of the
humanitarian thesis, armed force may therefore legitimately be
employed in the quest to realize these aspects of human
security.159
Adopting humanist objectives for war also alters the nature
of what counts as victory. Under a statist model of security,
victory meant vanquishing enemies on the battlefield, signing
armistices, concluding peace treaties, acquiring strategic
deterrents, or establishing and maintaining spheres of
influence. Success of armed intervention undertaken for
humanitarian purposes, on the other hand, necessitates
instituting deep political and social transformations in the
country or territory subject to armed intervention. The
intervening powers are obliged to ensure that governance
structures are established that would guarantee basic human
rights and enable the flourishing of democracy.160 In short,
pursuing human security through armed force requires, in many
cases, engaging in the difficult process of nation-building.
Doctrinally, the humanitarian thesis, as discussed above,
effectively neutralizes a number of the cardinal principles of
international law, many of which are embodied in the UN
Charter. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of states, the
preservation of the political independence and territorial
integrity of states, the inviolability of national boundaries, the
freedom of states to adopt systems of government of their
choice, and, ultimately, sovereignty are largely deactivated.
None of these principles may be invoked to fend off
intervention, including armed intervention, to achieve human
security.161
157. See, e.g., Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, New Threats to Human Security in the Era of
Globalization, 4 J. HUM. DEV. 167 (2003).
158. Gary King & Christopher Murray, Rethinking Human Security, 116 POL. SCI. Q.
585, 591 (2002).
159. TEITEL, supra note 88, at 201, 203.
160. See Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 391, 400 (2013).
161. See Alex Bellamy & Matt McDonald, The Utility of Human Security: Which
Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 373, 375–76
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Despite the profundity of these implications that the rise of
human security entails for international law and international
relations, the harshest attacks of the humanitarian thesis are
reserved for the institutional components of the UN Charter jus
ad bellum scheme. As discussed above, nothing in the UN
Charter proscribes the use of armed force to pursue human
security-related objectives. UN practice during and, more
frequently, after the Cold War bears out this assertion. On a
number of occasions, developments within the domestic affairs
of states, some of which involved human rights abuses, were
brought before the Security Council, which labeled them as
threats to the peace and at times took enforcement measures in
response to these situations.162 Undoubtedly, the politically
permissive climate of the post-Cold War years and the increase
in internal conflicts contributed to the Council’s willingness and
ability to authorize armed intervention for humanitarian
purposes. These interventions, whether they took the form of
UN peacekeeping operations or armed interventions sanctioned
by the Council but led by regional organizations,163 do not,

(2002) (“A discourse of human security that does not delegitimize states when they act
as agents of human insecurity, does not devalue sovereignty when it protects the
perpetrators of human wrongs . . . has, at best, very limited utility.”).
162. For example, in 1960 the Security Council authorized the deployment of a
large peacekeeping operation that, although first aimed at assisting the withdrawal of
Belgian troops from the Congo, quickly evolved into an operation seeking to protect
civilians, maintain law and order in a country threatened by civil war, and prevent the
secession of its largest and wealthiest provinces. See Stanley Hoffman, In Search of a
Thread: The UN in the Congo Labyrinth, 16 INT’L ORG. 331, 343–50 (1962). Another
example of the Security Council’s intervention in an internal conflict, albeit without
authorizing the use of force, is its passage of a series of resolutions relating to the
situation in the mandated territory of Palestine prior to the declaration of
independence by the State of Israel. On April 1, 1948, the Council passed Resolution
43 in which it called on the Jewish and Arab communities to mandate Palestine to
declare a truce and warned of the heavy responsibility that would befall the party that
would violate that truce. See S.C. Res. 43, para. 3, UN Doc. S/RES/42 (Apr. 1, 1948).
The Security Council’s condemnation of the South African apartheid regime and its
imposition of sanctions provides another example of UN intervention in the internal
affairs of states that, at least partially, sought to uphold basic human rights. See David
Johnson, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 887, 902–03 (1978). For an
overview of UN interventions in domestic situations that were considered a threat to
the peace, see Paul Szasz, Role of the United Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 345 (1983).
163. The leading examples of post-Cold War interventions in internal conflicts,
whether UN-led or UN-sanctioned, include the operations in the former Yugoslavia,
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however, represent a fundamental revision of either the
structure or substance of the UN Charter scheme. What these
post-Cold War interventions indicate is that in light of the
increasing incidence of internal armed conflicts and the human
toll exacted by these crises, the Council palpably expanded its
definition of the circumstances constituting threats to and
breaches of the peace, and exhibited greater preparedness to
authorize the use of force in response.164
Nonetheless, it remains that whether at the height of Cold
War tensions or in today’s less bellicose international
environment, the sine qua non for undertaking any such
intervention is securing Security Council approval, which in
effect means ensuring the consent, or at least the acquiescence,
of the P5.165 It is this institutional aspect of the Charter scheme
that elicits the sharpest criticism from proponents of the
humanitarian thesis. Especially after the tragic failure of a
number of UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s,166 and
repeatedly thereafter when, as in the Syrian situation, the
United Nations failed to authorize forceful measures to protect
civilians, proponents of humanitarianism became increasingly
“[c]onvinced that the UN Security Council cannot be relied
upon to address these problems, and that the United
Nations . . . is somehow to blame, they argue for a right of
‘unilateral humanitarian intervention’, that is, a right to

Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. See generally ENFORCING
RESTRAINT (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1993).
164. See Ruth Gordon, UN Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia and
Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 519, 545 (1994); see also Jennifer M. Welsh, The Security
Council and Humanitarian Intervention, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND
WAR supra note 129 at 537–38 (speaking of the increased willingness of the Council to
intervene in civil conflicts which reflects an “expanded definition of threats to
international peace and security”).
165. See Erik Voeten, The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to
Legitimize the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 527, 531–32 (2005).
166. The story of the UN’s peacekeeping failures has been told elsewhere and is
not of direct relevance for the purposes of this paper. For a general overview, see LISE
MORJÉ HOWARD, UN PEACEKEEPING IN CIVIL WARS 1–52 (2008); PAUL DIEHL, PEACE
OPERATIONS 118–46 (2008); ALEX BELLAMY, PAUL WILLIAMS & STUART GRIFFIN,
UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING 75–93 (2004); U.N.S.C., Rep. of the Panel on
Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000).
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intervene for humanitarian purposes without the authorization
of the Security Council.”167
Skepticism regarding the necessity of Security Council
approval for armed intervention climaxed in the aftermath of
the 1999 Kosovo War. Unable to obtain the requisite Security
Council authorization due to a prospective double RussoChinese veto, NATO commenced a 78-day bombing campaign
to protect the ethnic Albanian community of Kosovo against
mass atrocities being perpetrated by Serbian forces.168
Commenting on NATO’s resort to armed force, former
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) Judge Bruno Simma
noted that the situation in Kosovo presented a “hard case in
which terrible dilemmas must be faced and imperative political
and moral considerations may appear to leave no choice but to
act outside the law.”169 This divergence between, on the one
hand, humanitarian imperatives and, on the other, the legalist
Charter scheme, led to the oft-cited conclusion that the Kosovo
War was “illegal but legitimate.”170 The war was judged to be
illegal due to the absence of a Security Council imprimatur, but
was considered legitimate because it served the moral objective
of protecting civilians from mass atrocities.
This finding represented a victory for the humanitarian
thesis. The war, it was believed, had driven a wedge between an
anachronistic legality and an emergent humanitarian legitimacy.
It demonstrated that human values had infiltrated the statist
realm of jus ad bellum and overturned its main tenets. In the
months and years following the war, it was widely assumed that
167. MICHAEL BYRES, WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT 92 (2007). For example, a former Canadian Foreign Minister and
leading advocate of human security expressed exasperation at the impact the P5
prerogatives were having on the ability of the Security Council to address situations that
threaten human security. See Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security and Global Governance:
Putting People First, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 19, 21–22 (2001); see also Gerd Oberleitner,
Human Security: A Challenge to International Law, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 185, 192
(2005) (“A Security Council that applied the concept of human security would look
different from the Security Council we know now.”).
168. See generally IVO DAALDER & MICHAEL O’HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO’S
WAR TO SAVE KOSOVO (2000).
169. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN, and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1, 22 (1999).
170. INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000)
[hereinafter THE KOSOVO REPORT].

590 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:551
the doctrinal and institutional components of international
legality had become inadequate,171 leading to governmental,
inter-governmental, and scholarly proposals to revisit the
existing jus ad bellum scheme.
In addition to its legal consequences, the Kosovo War also
had profound political implications. First, the war set a
precedent that is regularly invoked in situations where the UN
fails to take forceful action to prevent the perpetration of mass
atrocities, such as during debates over whether the United States
should intervene militarily in Syria.172 Second, the war was
considered a milestone in the ongoing transformation of the
values of the international system. In the old anarchical world of
sovereign states, war was waged to pursue the national interest
and protect state security. Its objectives were deterring
aggression, maintaining balances of power, and expanding
spheres of influence. In the emergent global community of
humankind, however, war, as Kosovo demonstrated, is an
instrument of humanity, and its purposes became the
vindication of “moral ideals, self-determination, democracy, and
human rights.”173
II. THE LEGITIMACIES OF HUMANITARIAN WAR 174
For a few years after the Kosovo War, the question of
humanitarian war was the cause célèbre of the global diplomatic
community to the extent that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
171. Peter Hilpod, From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect: Making
a Utopia True?, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 462, 466.
172. See Jack Goldsmith, What Happened to the Rule of Law?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opinion/what-happened-to-the-rule-oflaw.html.
173. See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the Turn
to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 161 (2002).
174. I prefer the term “humanitarian war” over “humanitarian intervention” for
two reasons. The first is for the sake of semantic clarity. ‘Intervention’ denotes a broad
set of policy tools, only one of which is the resort to force. Other measures include
diplomatic censure, political pressure, economic sanctions, and arms embargoes all of
which are frequently used to respond to humanitarian crises. Second, armed force is a
special category of intervention. Because it is highly invasive, entails considerable
human cost, and potentially violates the prohibition on the use of force in international
relations, justifying war requires satisfying a higher and more complex standard of
scrutiny than others forms of ‘intervention.’
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dedicated his address during the opening of the 54th Session of
the UN General Assembly to assessing the future of human
security and intervention.175 Juxtaposing the inaction during the
Rwandan genocide against the intervention in Kosovo, Annan
challenged world leaders to devise mechanisms that would
ensure effective international responses to humanitarian crises
without demolishing the post-World War II collective security
architecture. The international community instantly took up
Annan’s challenge.176 Countless governments, civil society
organizations, and scholars working in fields including law,
philosophy, ethics, political science, and military affairs
generated a voluminous literature on both Kosovo and the
broader question of humanitarian war.177
The purpose of this Part is not to relive the debate over the
legality of the Kosovo War or any particular conflict, such as the
Libyan or Syrian civil wars, that posed difficult questions
regarding the legality, legitimacy, or policy implications of
forcefully intervening to protect civilians. Rather, the objective is
to construct a typology of the justifications of the use of force for
humanitarian purposes, especially those that emerged in the
aftermath of Kosovo. I call this typology the legitimacies of
humanitarian war.
The purpose of this typology is to demonstrate that shortly
after the Kosovo War the international community was
presented with a broad range of justifications for waging
humanitarian war that, to varying degrees, would have entailed
overturning the post-World War II jus ad bellum scheme. As I
argue below, however, these legitimacies of humanitarian war
were rejected. Instead, a conscious choice was made in favor of
the rules, institutions, and state-centric values of the jus ad bellum
scheme embodied in the UN Charter. This challenges claims
advanced by proponents of the humanitarian thesis about the
changing nature of international law and casts a shadow of
175. See U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4, (Sept.
10, 1999).
176. I say “instantly” because the speaker immediately following Annan was the
Algerian President who, speaking on behalf of Africa, warned against any diminution of
sovereignty which was described as the “final defense against the rules of an unjust
world.” Id. at 14.
177. For an overview of this literature, see Adam Roberts, The So-Called ‘Right’ of
Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2000).
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doubt over contentions that global politics is evolving into a lawgoverned community of humankind.
Before proceeding, however, a few remarks should be
borne in mind. First, as Simon Chesterman demonstrated in a
highly illuminating volume, the debate on the resort to force to
protect individuals against atrocities perpetrated by their own
governments is far from novel.178 For centuries, governments,
lawyers, theologians, and philosophers examined the
justifiability of waging war to protect civilians. Many of the
arguments that appeared in the aftermath of Kosovo advocating
the right to wage humanitarian war echoed intellectual moves
made in earlier contexts.
Second, Kosovo was not the only crisis in recent history to
spark criticism of the UN Charter-based jus ad bellum scheme.
The 9/11 attacks, the war on terrorism, the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (“WMD”), and the doctrine of
preemption all spawned governmental and scholarly challenges
to the logic and relevance of the rules and institutions of jus ad
bellum.179 Third, as discussed below, a common thread running
throughout the legitimacies of humanitarian war is the desire to
either reinterpret or revisit jus ad bellum to bring it in line with
the emergent humanist legitimacy. In other words, for
proponents of the humanitarian thesis, the gap that the Kosovo
War had revealed between legality and legitimacy was to be
bridged by making the former comport with the latter.
Fourth, the project of reforming legality to reflect
humanitarian values was principally adopted by western
governments and scholars. Many countries and scholars,
especially from the global south, harbored reservations
regarding attempts to dismantle or modify the post-World
War II jus ad bellum scheme. Most of these skeptical voices were
not opposed to the use of force to protect civilians per se.
Rather, their principal objection was to the unilateral resort to
force without Security Council authorization.180
178. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? 1–44 (2001).
179. See generally BEYOND PREEMPTION: FORCE AND LEGITIMACY IN A CHANGING
WORLD (Ivo Daalder ed., 2007).
180. Nolte, supra note 147, at 164. For example, during the North American
Treaty Organization’s (“NATO”) intervention in Kosovo, Egypt’s Foreign Minister
Amre Moussa condemned the atrocities perpetrated against the Albanian community
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Fifth, the structure of legitimation, especially when
justifying the resort to war, is complex.181 Arguments supporting
the use of force frequently draw on multiple forms of
legitimation. Therefore, readers should keep in mind that, in
reality, the resort to force is rarely justified on the basis of one
single form of legitimation from among those in my typology.182
Sixth, when dealing with global politics, a slight dose of
cynicism is healthy. Justifications for the resort to war, especially
war waged for humanitarian purposes, are routinely cloaked in
the language of international law and universal morality.183
These justifications could reflect genuine humanitarian
concerns or may be deployed to conceal the pursuit of national
self-interests. More realistically, however, forceful intervention to
protect the citizens of foreign countries is driven by a diverse set
of motivations, which include a mix of ideational and material

of Kosovo, but noted that “dealing with this issue falls within the jurisdiction of the UN
and the Security Council.” The Indian Foreign Ministry also expressed concern
regarding the use of force by NATO, which it warned would “seriously undermine the
authority of the entire UN system.” These and other statements made in response to
the Kosovo War are available in HEIKE KRIEGER, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 1974–1999 424–99 (2001). The
Non-Aligned Movement, which is the largest bloc at the United Nations, also repeatedly
declared its opposition to “all unilateral military actions, or use of force or threat of use
of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence,” of states and
expressed “strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally
imposed measures that undermine the UN Charter and international law.” See Final
Document of the XV Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the NonAligned Movement, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt July 15–16 2009. NAM2009/FD/Doc.1, at
paras. 19.4, 24.5.
181. Although writing in the context of judicial reasoning, Robert Summers’
observations about the structure and components of justification are relevant here,
since the use of force, like adjudication, is a form of the exercise of coercion. See
Robert Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law
Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 727–28 (1978).
182. The justifications presented by NATO member states in the aftermath of the
Kosovo War attest to this complex and multifaceted structure of justification. During
oral pleadings held before the ICJ in a case brought by Serbia against NATO member
states, the agent for the United States noted that the war was justified on a number of
grounds, which I categorize in different forms of legitimation. These grounds included
the impending humanitarian catastrophe, the threat posed to neighboring countries by
the conflict, the human rights perpetrated by Serbian forces, and previous UN Security
Council resolutions. See Public Sitting in the Case Concerning the Legality of the Use of
Force (Yugoslavia v. USA), 1999 I.C.J. 916, at 10 (May 11).
183. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International
Relations: A Rational Choice Approach, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S115 (2002).
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factors.184 Nonetheless, whatever the underlying motivations
driving the decision to resort to humanitarian war, the process
of legitimation and providing justification for waging war, even
if functioning solely as a façade for ulterior political motives, is
important for two reasons.
First, legitimacy is a valuable commodity in international
relations. All states, whether Great Powers or peripheral players,
seek to justify their policies, especially the decision to resort to
war, to a diverse audience of domestic constituencies, allies,
adversaries, and a global civil society.185 This is because all
coercion, whether in the form of armed force, or even in its less
bellicose manifestation, judicial decisions, requires legitimation
to distinguish it from mere banditry or arbitrary tyranny.186 This
felt need to ensure that the exercise of power and influence
enjoys legitimacy is a phenomenon that has long been
recognized in domestic societies,187 and that has only recently
gained greater attention in the study of international politics.188
Domestically, societies seek to subject coercion to “justifiable
rules, and the powerful themselves will seek to secure consent to
their power from at least the most important among their
subordinates.”189 Internationally, Great Powers, like dominant
players in domestic politics, seek to transform their
preponderant power into authority. This is because a legitimacy
184. ANDREAS KRIEG, MOTIVATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS 135 (2013) (concluding, after
examining a series of case studies, that “humanitarian interventions were motivated by
a set of mixed motivations comprising both altruistic and interest-related factors”).
185. CORNELIU BJOLA, LEGITIMIZING THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 7 (2009); see Schachter, supra note 140, at 110. The importance of domestic
audiences to explaining state behavior, including during conflict situations, is an aspect
of policy-making that structural realism is incapable of accounting for due to its
singular focus on the international system. See Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 460 (1988) (discussing the
“importance of targeting international threats, offers, and side-payments with an eye
towards their domestic incidence at home and abroad”).
186. Matthew Lister, The Legitimating Role of Consent in International Law, 11 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 663, 667 (2010).
187. In his seminal work on the content and forms of legitimacy, Max Weber
spoke of the “generally observable need of any power, or even any advantage of life, to
justify itself.” MAX WEBER, 3 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 953 (1968).
188. Jens Steffek, Legitimacy in International Relations: From State Compliance to
Citizens Consensus, in LEGITIMACY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL POLITICS 175 (Achim
Hurrelmann et al. eds., 2007).
189. DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 3 (1991).

2014]

THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM

595

deficit “‘imposes heavy costs on the controllers.’ . . . The
efficiency advantages of authority probably motivate the
commonly observed impulse of the powerful to try to legitimate
their power.”190 Legitimacy is also valuable because it contributes
to international stability. A widely shared perception of the
legitimacy of the principal powers, institutions, ordering
principles, and rules of global affairs is instrumental to the
maintenance of stability in international affairs.191
Second, legitimacy is important because it has the potential
to shape future behavior. Legitimation is a communicative act of
giving reasons.192 As Frederick Schauer explains, giving reasons
is a process of justifying particular actions in specific contexts on
the bases of general abstract principles.193 This structure of
reason-giving is not unique to domestic politics. Justification in
global politics, including in the high-stakes area of international
security, functions in the same way.194 This appeal to general
principles, especially if done repeatedly, creates a commitment,
or at least a felt need, to react to similar situations in the future
in accordance with these previously invoked principles.195 In
other words, repeated justification creates precedents. Even if
not determinative of every future case, precedent, if widely
accepted, gradually contributes to shaping behavior by
excluding policy options that are unjustifiable on the basis of
established general principles.196
190. Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority, 53 INT’L ORG. 379, 388 (1999) (quoting
ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND WELFARE 115
(Transaction Publishers, 2d ed. 1992 (1953)).
191. IAN CLARK, LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 82 (2005).
192. Craig Matheson, Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy, 38 BRIT. J.
SOC. 199, 200 (1987).
193. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641–42 (1995).
194. Martti Koskenniemi observed that justifications of Security Council action
make “constant reference to normative codes, rules, or principles . . . They refer back
to more general, systemic theories, assumptions, worldviews, and prejudices that
provide the implicit matrix that makes description possible.” Martti Koskenniemi, The
Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 455, 468 (1995–1996).
195. Schauer, supra note 193, at 658.
196. Although speaking of precedent in the context of the Common Law, I think
the following observation by David Strauss also applies to justification in international
politics. Speaking of the role played by judgments of fairness and sound social policy in
judicial decision, Strauss says: “Even in the small minority of cases in which the law is
disputed, the correct answer will sometimes be clear. And—perhaps the most
important point—even when the outcome is not clear, and arguments about fairness
and good policy come into play, the precedents will usually limit the possible outcomes
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States, including Great Powers, are cognizant of this power
of principle and the pull of precedent.197 This is exhibited in the
care exercised by governments not to justify their policies in
terms that may undermine their interests or freedom of action
in future settings.198 This is also manifested in the conscious
attempts of states and many other actors active in global
governance to promote, propagate, and ultimately establish as
dominant, versions of legitimacy that conform to their
normative commitments and interests. This process of shaping
what counts as appropriate behavior in international affairs by
instrumentally ‘engineering’ perceptions of legitimacy has been
termed “strategic social construction.”199
In a sense, therefore, the legitimacies of humanitarian war,
to which we now turn, should be viewed not solely as attempts to
that a judge can reach.” DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 39 (2010). Ryan
Goodman makes a similar point in the context of justifying war waged for
humanitarian purposes: “[T]he imagery and justifications that leaders use to build
support for their policies at one stage of hostilities constrain their actions at later
stages.” Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 AM. J. INT’L
L. 107, 123 (2006). Nothing here should be read as suggesting that precedent, whether
in judicial practice or international relations, will be determinative of each and every
future political situation or case. Just as precedent can be overturned in the Common
Law, precedent may be disregarded in international relations.
197. For example, in his magna opus, Henry Kissinger celebrated the genius of
Austrian Foreign Minister Prince Klemens von Metternich for constructing the postNapoleonic political order “not by marshalling superior force, but by obtaining a
voluntary submission to his version of legitimacy.” HENRY KISSINGER, A WORLD
RESTORED 321 (1957).
198. Incidentally, the Kosovo War and the subsequent declaration of
independence by Kosovo are prime examples of the care exercised by Great Powers to
avoid setting precedents that may undermine their interests in future settings. In the
aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo War, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright was careful
to signal that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo should not be viewed as a precedent for
future intervention by the alliance for humanitarian purposes. See Madeleine Albright,
US Sec'y of State, Prepared Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations, June 28,
1999, available at http://www.cfr.org/nato/prepared-remarks-secretary-state-madeleinek-albright/p3189. Similarly, countries that supported the independence of Kosovo
repeatedly declared that this was a sui generis case that should not set a precedent in
favor of secession in other regions of the world. See Rein Mullerson, Precedents in the
Mountains: On the Parallels and Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and
Abkhazia, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 2 (2009).
199. Strategic social construction is a process where actors make “detailed meansends calculations to maximize their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize
involve changing the other players’ utility function in ways that reflect the normative
commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.” Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink,
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 910 (1998).
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revisit the UN Charter jus ad bellum scheme, but also as a bid to
establish a humanitarian version of legitimacy as the globally
dominant normative framework. Realizing the potency of
legitimacy, proponents of the humanitarian thesis sought to
reshape perceptions of legitimacy as part of their project to
establish a law-governed community of humankind. In other
words, the humanitarian critique of the rules and institutions of
jus ad bellum represents far more than “a minor exception or
adjustment to the received organization of the human race.
Instead, it arguably exemplified and acted as the doctrinal
advance guard of the whole constellation of forces confronting
the sovereign state’s once indisputable claim to be the principle
locus of power and loyalty.”200
My typology of justifications of humanitarian war includes
three categories. The differentiating feature between these
categories is their relationship to the existing jus ad bellum
scheme, which means the extent to which each category takes
this Charter scheme as its point of departure to justify
humanitarian war. To express this, I draw on the principles of
lex specialis and lex generalis.201 The first category of legitimation
techniques seeks to fit humanitarian war within the structure of
the UN Charter scheme. That is why I call this category ‘Lex
Specialis Legitimacy.’ The second category I label ‘Lex Generalis
Legitimacy’ because it justifies humanitarian war on the grounds
of general international law as opposed to the specific rules of
jus ad bellum. The third and final category is called ‘Moral
Legitimacy’ because, instead of drawing on international law, it
justifies humanitarian war on extra-legal bases inspired by the
just war tradition.

200. Tom Farer, Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and
Legitimacy, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS
55 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Keohane eds., 2003).
201. The maxim lex specialis derogat legi generalis expresses the principle that
‘specific’ law shall overrule ‘general’ law. This means that should a conflict emerge
between two principles of law, the more specialized law or the body of law most
relevant to the question at hand shall overrule other general principles of international
law. In the case of justifying humanitarian war, which is a question relating to the resort
to armed force in international relations, the lex specialis is jus ad bellum. For a detailed
examination of this maxim, see Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the
Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006).
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A. Lex Specialis Legitimacy
Because of thy law am I content with thee, O state!
-Roscoe Pound202

Legitimizing exercises of coercion, such as the resort to
war, on the grounds of preexisting rules is a well-trodden
justificatory path. Indeed, etymologically, legitimacy, or legitimus
as it was referred to in Roman law, was originally understood as
acting in conformity with the law.203 The lure of legal
legitimation is that it justifies policy, not on transient interests or
arbitrary freedom, but on properly enacted preexisting rules.204
In this case, the relevant body of rules is the UN Charter-based
jus ad bellum scheme, which, as discussed above, is predicated on
a general prohibition on the use of force that admits two
exceptions: self-defense and Security Council-authorized
enforcement action. Therefore, attempts to fit unilateral
humanitarian war within this legal structure take the form of
intellectual moves that seek to expand the avenues through
which armed force can legally be exercised in international
relations.
1. Parsing the Words
The first move to justify humanitarian war according to the
existing jus ad bellum scheme adopts a reading of article 2(4) of
the UN Charter that considerably shrinks the breadth of the
general prohibition on the use of force in international
relations. According to this provision, UN members “shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.” Some proponents of the
humanitarian thesis consider the words “territorial integrity and
political independence” as constituting the limits of the general
202. Roscoe Pound, The Case for Law, 1 VAL. U. L. REV. 201, 214 (1967).
203. CLARK, supra note 191, at 17.
204. Matheson, supra note 192, at 210; see also Richard Fallon, “The Rule of Law” As
a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1997) (explaining that the
rule of law is predicated on “reasoned elaboration of the connection between
recognized, pre-existing sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and
responsibilities in particular cases”).
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prohibition on the use of force enacted by article 2(4). Some
governments have also adopted this reading of the Charter,
albeit in different circumstances.205
According to this approach, force used for purposes other
than threatening the territorial integrity of states, such as by
altering a country’s boundaries, or undermining its political
independence by for example imposing a political leadership, is
justifiable according to the text of article 2(4).206 It is, therefore,
argued that since a “genuine humanitarian intervention does
not result in territorial conquest or political subjugation,”
waging war to protect civilians is not proscribed by the UN
Charter.207
Furthermore, proponents of the humanitarian thesis
maintain that the rise of human rights and the receding of
sovereignty transformed the meaning of the phrase “political
independence” as used in article 2(4). As Michael Reisman
contends, the right of every state to enjoy political
independence is conditional on upholding and protecting
human rights. Failure to fulfill that obligation deactivates the
right to political independence and constitutes permissible
grounds for forcibly intervening to protect civilians.208
2. Implicit Approval and Ex Post Facto Ratification
The second move made to justify war fought for
humanitarian purposes on the grounds of the existing jus ad
bellum scheme seeks to broaden the means through which the
205. During the hearings of the Corfu Channel case before the ICJ, the United
Kingdom argued that a right of forcible self-help continues to be recognized in
international law as long as exercising this right does not entail threatening the
territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Unlike uses of force for
humanitarian purposes, self-help entails the use of force by a state to protect legal
rights that have been infringed by another state. See Statement by Sir Eric Beckett on
Nov. 12 1948. Some Third World countries and the former Soviet Union also used
similar arguments when justifying uses of force to assist colonized peoples achieve
independence. The prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4),
according to this argument, did not apply to situations of decolonization. See: DINSTEIN,
supra note 117, at 92.
206. See for example: Waldock, supra note 125, at 493.
207. FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 151 (2d ed. 1997); C.F. Amerasinghe, The Conundrum of Recourse to Force—To
Protect Persons, 3 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 7 (2006).
208. W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860, 861 (1999).
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Security Council expresses its approval of enforcement action.
Originally, the drafters of the Charter intended for the Security
Council to take direct charge of the execution of enforcement
measures through a Military Staff Committee composed of the
Chiefs of Staff of the P5.209 The realities of the Cold War,
however, prevented this committee from ever fulfilling its
mandate or concluding agreements with member states
pursuant to which their armed forces would have been available
for deployment by the Security Council.210
History, however, confirmed the prescience of Justice
Holmes’ remark that words are “the skin of living thought.”211
UN practice evolved beyond the strictures of the Charter by
permitting the Security Council to delegate individual states or
coalitions of states to execute enforcement action on its
behalf.212 The formula routinely used by the Security Council to
express its assent to the resort to armed force is the adoption of
a resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter in which it uses
the phrase “all necessary measures,” which is unanimously
understood to mean an authorization to use force in the
execution of the mandate contained in the resolution.213 Passing
such a resolution requires the affirmative vote of nine of the
Council’s fifteen members, including the P5, which, as in the
cases of Kosovo and Syria, is not always forthcoming.
To circumvent this process of explicit authorizations of the
use of force, advocates of the humanitarian thesis proposed
alternative means through which Security Council may be
considered to have approved enforcement action. One of these
is “implicit authorization.” In the days following the
commencement of Operation Allied Force, as NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo was codenamed, a number of countries
209. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1.
210. See Richard Bruning, The United Nations’ Military Staff Committee: Future or
Failure? 13 MIL. L. & WAR L. REV. 35 (1974); Jonathan Soffer, All for One or All for All:
The UN Military Staff Committee and the Contradictions of American Internationalism, 21
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 45 (1997).
211. Towne v. Eisner 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
212. DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 3–50, 142–67 (1999); see also John Quigley, The Privatization of
Security Council Enforcement Action: A Threat to Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 249,
277 (1995) (arguing that the practice of the Security Council suggests that the “Charter
is being amended in a de facto way.”).
213. See CORTEN, supra note 117, at 312–13.
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and regional organizations declared that they considered the
operation a breach of international law because it was
unauthorized by the Security Council.214 In response, the US
Secretary of State and the French Foreign Minister intimated
that previous Security Council resolutions provided bases for the
ongoing bombing of Serbia.215 The fact that the Security Council
passed three resolutions under Chapter VII on the situation in
Kosovo prior to the commencement of hostilities,216 two of
which declared the conflict to constitute a threat to
international peace and security,217 was viewed as providing
implicit Security Council authorization for the use of force.218
This argument was also employed to justify the forceful
protection of civilians in other contexts, including the no-fly
zones established by the United States, United Kingdom, and
France over northern and southern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf
War,219 and the 1990 ECOMOG intervention in Liberia.220
214. Understandably, Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations issued a fiery
statement that expressed outrage at the NATO operation and emphasized that “those,
who are involved in this unilateral use of force against the sovereign FRY carries out in
violation of the UN Charter and without authorization from the Security Council,
should realize the serious responsibility they pay.” Similarly, China announced that the
bombing represented a “blatant violation of the UN Charter as well as the accepted
norms in international law.” The Rio Group also expressed “anxiety” at the hostilities,
and argued that the Security Council is the entity charged with the primary
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. See THE KOSOVO CONFLICT:
A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS 727–37 (Philip Auerswald & David
Auerswald eds., 2000). South Africa’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also issued a statement
in which it “noted with grave concern the current military action against the sovereign
state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is in violation of the UN Charter and
accepted norms of international law . . . . The erosion of the UN Charter and the
authority of the Security Council cannot be tolerated by the international community.”
KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 493.
215. THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY THROUGH DOCUMENTS,
supra note 214, at 742 (remarks by Secretary of State Albright); id., at 735 (remarks by
French Foreign Minister Vedrin).
216. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/11 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998).
217. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/11(9 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1203 (1998).
218. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Legal Basis for the Action Taken by
NATO, March 25, 1999; see Nico Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will:
Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council, 3 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 59, 82 (1999).
219. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Kurdish population of northern Iraq
and the Shiite majority residing in the southern provinces led a rebellion against
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Expectedly, the latter unleashed a brutal campaign of
repression, especially against the Kurds in the north, which led to an increase in
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In addition to citing Security Council resolutions adopted
prior to the commencement of hostilities, it was suggested that
the Council could approve armed intervention undertaken to
protect civilians retroactively by passing resolutions after the
termination of armed operations. I call this form of legitimation
ex post facto ratification. On June 10, 1999, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII, which established an
international security and administrative presence in Kosovo
and outlined the contours of a political settlement to the
conflict. These aspects of the resolution were considered to
constitute a form of recognition by the Council of the results of
NATO’s intervention, which, for some scholars, “effectively
ratified what earlier might have constituted unilateral action
questionable as a matter of law.”221
The failure of the Security Council to condemn an armed
intervention, or reproach those executing it, has also been
repeatedly advanced as a form of ex post facto ratification.222
During Operation Allied Force, Russia, India, and Belarus
submitted a joint draft resolution demanding the cessation of
hostilities to the Security Council.223 The fact that this resolution
was rejected has been considered indicative of the Council’s
acquiescence to the then-ongoing military operations in Kosovo.
Similarly, in the aftermath of the ECOMOG intervention in
Liberia, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement
refugee flows from these areas into neighboring countries. As part of the international
response to these developments, the no-fly zones were established to deny Saddam
Hussein’s troops the advantage of air superiority.
220. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(“ECOMOG”) was established by the Economic Community of West African States
(“ECOWAS”) to intervene in the Liberian civil war to, inter alia, restore law and order,
release political prisoners, and prepare the country for free and fair elections. See Jules
Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use
Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124, 126 (1999).
221. Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 824, 827 (1999); see THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 170, at 172. For an
extended discussion, see TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89–90 (2005).
222. An early example of this argument was used by the United States to justify its
quarantine of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Abram Chayes, Law and the
Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 556 (1963) (“[S]urely it is no more surprising
to say that failure of the Security Council to disapprove regional action amounts to
authorization . . . .”).
223. For the text of the draft resolution and excerpts of the discussion that ensued
in the Security Council on the proposed text, see KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 432.
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and then adopted Resolution 788. Not only did these
documents fail to condemn what had been an unauthorized use
of force, they commended the intervention for its contribution
to peace and stability in the region.224
B. Lex Generalis Legitimacy
The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life
-2 Corinthians 3:6

To most states and many scholars, including some
advocates of the humanitarian thesis, these justifications for
waging humanitarian war were unconvincing. Oscar Schachter,
for example, remarked that reading article 2(4) as permitting
the resort to force to protect civilians “requires an Orwellian
interpretation” of its terms.225 Meanwhile, Michael Reisman
commented that theories such as implicit authorization and ex
post facto ratification unsuccessfully attempt to weave a
“retrospective tapestry of authority” on interventions that
breach the relevant UN Charter rules.226
Desirous of deploying legality to legitimate humanitarian
war, but cognizant of the difficulty of fitting this form of
intervention within the doctrinal and institutional framework of
the existing jus ad bellum scheme, a number of countries and
scholars invoked principles and doctrines of general
international law to justify war waged to protect civilians. I call
this form of justification lex generalis legitimation.

224. See generally, S.C. Res. 788, U.N.Doc.S/RES/788 (Nov. 19 1992); Vera
Gowlland-Debbas, The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the
Framework of UN Peace Maintenance, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 361, 375 (2000).
225. SCHACHTER, supra note 140, at 118; see Mehrdad Payandeh, The United
Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 359–360
(2011) (“[I]nternational courts and the majority of international lawyers have until
now been unwilling to restrict the scope of Article 2(4) of the Charter or enlarge the
possible grounds for the justification of the use of force.”); Richard Falk, Kosovo, World
Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 853 (1999) (“In essence,
the textual level of analysis, upon which legalists rely, cannot give a satisfactory basis for
NATO intervention. . . .”).
226. Reisman, supra note 208, at 860; see also Gray, supra note 129, at 91
(describing attempts to bestow Security Council authorization on interventions such as
Kosovo as “extremely controversial.”).
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1. Human Rights and the Purposes of the United Nations
The principal purpose of the United Nations is the
prevention of war and the maintenance of inter-state peace.227
World War II and the atrocities perpetrated by the Axis powers
convinced the organization’s founding fathers, however, that
achieving this central objective required enabling the United
Nations to deal with the root causes of conflict, including the
economic, social, and humanitarian sources of instability.228
Chapter I of the Charter, titled “The Purposes of the United
Nations,” bears evidence of this bold ambition. While article
1(1) tasks the organization with protecting peace and
suppressing aggression, article 1(3) directs it to promote and
encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion.”229
This identification of the protection human rights as an
aim to be pursued by the United Nations is routinely cited by
proponents of the humanitarian thesis to demonstrate that the
resort to armed force in the service of this objective comports
with the overall purposes of the United Nations, and thus, with
general international law.230 To support this claim, reference is
also made to the closing line of article 2(4). As discussed above,
this provision prohibits the resort to force in any “manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”231
Invoking these words in combination of the Charter provisions
on human rights, some proponents of the humanitarian thesis
argue that war waged to protect civilians is legally legitimate
because it serves one of the purposes of the United Nations.232
227. Wolfrum, supra note 120, at 42 (considering the maintenance of
international peace and security to be the “overarching purpose of the United
Nations”).
228. KENNEDY, supra note 135, 45–46.
229. UN Charter art. 1.
230. See Malvina Halberstam, The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (1995).
231. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
232. Marc Weller, Forcible Humanitarian Action: The Case of Kosovo, in REDEFINING
SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 319 (Michael Bothe, Mary
Ellen O’Connell & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 2005). Ronald Dworkin adopted a similar
approach in one of his final pieces, noting, “[w]e might understand the ‘Purposes of
the United Nations’ cited in article 2(4) to be those that flow from the moral
responsibility nations had to create that institution: the responsibility to protect people
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2. Parallel Custom, Emerging Custom, and Instant Custom
Despite its monumental importance, the UN Charter
remains only a single treaty within the broader universe of
international law. The Charter, even in the area of the
regulation of the use of force in international relations, does not
incorporate the entire corpus of relevant rules of international
law.233 This reality, coupled with the difficulty of interpreting the
Charter as permitting unilateral humanitarian war,234 led many
proponents of the humanitarian thesis to argue that waging war
to protect civilians without Security Council authorization is
legally legitimate on the basis of customary international law.
Invoking custom to justify humanitarian war has taken a
number of forms. The first of these argues that a customary
right of unilateral armed humanitarian intervention exists in
parallel to the treaty-based jus ad bellum Charter scheme. Most
scholars agree that prior to the adoption of the UN Charter in
1945, customary international law recognized a right of
intervention to prevent the perpetration of mass atrocities.235
Advocates of the right to wage humanitarian war argue that this
body of customary rules remained largely intact despite the
entry into force of the UN Charter with its general prohibition
on the use of force.236
from the dangers of the insulated sovereignty of the Westphalian system.” Ronald
Dworkin, A New Philosophy of International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 23 (2013).
233. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (June 27) (separate opinion of President Nagendra Singh) (the
UN Charter “by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use of force in
international relations”).
234. For example, the UK House of Commons noted in a report published in the
aftermath of the Kosovo War that, “Operation Allied Force was contrary to the specific
terms of what might be termed the basic law of the international community—the UN
Charter.” FOREIGN AFF. COMM., FOURTH REPORT, 1999–2000, H.C. 28-II, at para 48
(U.K.) available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/
cmfaff/28/2802.htm.
235. See e.g., Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J.
203, 235 (1973).
236. Scholars making this argument usually frame their claim in terms of the
continued existence of a right of ‘self-help’ that survived the adoption of the UN
Charter. According to this view, a failure of the UN collective security mechanism
unlocks a state’s right to use force to protect internationally guaranteed rights. This
principle of self-help, the argument goes, also applies to the use of force to uphold
internationally recognized human rights. See, e.g., Richard Lillich, Forcible Self-Help By
States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 346 (1968). In a similar move,
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Even if it were conceded that the UN Charter overruled
earlier customary norms and proscribed the use of force to
protect civilians except with the authorization of the Security
Council, some scholars and states contended that customary law
evolved since 1945 to recognize an emerging right of forceful
humanitarian intervention. Speaking at Security Council
meeting in the aftermath of the Kosovo War, the Dutch
Ambassador to the United Nations encouraged delegations that
had expressed reservations about the legality of NATO’s
intervention to “realize that the Charter is not the only source of
international law,” and to accept that “since the day it was
drafted, the world has witnessed a gradual shift . . . making
respect for human rights more mandatory and respect for
sovereignty less absolute.”237 As a result of this shift, it is argued
that customary international law has come to recognize a right
to the use of force unilaterally to protect civilians against mass
human rights violations.238 To corroborate this claim, a number
of armed interventions undertaken for humanitarian purposes
since 1945 are cited as evidence of state practice supporting a
customary right of forceful intervention.239
To further buttress claims of an emergent customary right
of armed humanitarian intervention, proponents of the
humanitarian thesis deploy arguments associated with the
constitutionalization of international law discussed earlier in this
paper. During oral pleadings in a case filed before the ICJ by
Yugoslavia against NATO member states for their participation
in the Kosovo War, Belgium submitted that international law
had recognized that the prevention of the violent repression of
human rights, including through the resort to force, was taking
Michael Glennon argued that repeated violations of the general prohibition on the use
of force enshrined in article 2(4) of the Charter have effectively extinguished this rule,
and reinstated the freedom of states to resort to force that existed in the pre-Charter
era. See MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AFTER KOSOVO 62–64 (2001).
237. U.N.S.C., Rep. of the Security Council, Jun. 10, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4011.
238. See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the NATO Intervention in
Kosovo, 49 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 926, 931 (2000).
239. For a survey of these incidents and views regarding the precedential value of
these examples of state practice, see SEAN MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE
UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER 83–116 (1996). See also Christopher
Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 141,
161–71 (2002).
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precedence over sovereignty. This, Belgium reasoned, was
because intervention to protect civilians facing the threat of
mass atrocities serves “essential values which also rank as jus
cogens.”240 In other words, the normative hierarchization of
international law and the rise to preeminence of human rights
overturned basic tenets of international law, such as sovereignty
and non-intervention, and cast doubts over the relevance and
utility of the Charter jus ad bellum scheme.
Scholars have also echoed the view that the humanization
of the values of international law challenges the doctrinal and
institutional components of jus ad bellum. Michael Reisman, for
example, has argued that sovereignty today is understood not as
state sovereignty, but as popular sovereignty.241 Therefore, the UN
Charter, with article 2(4) at its epicenter, ought to be
interpreted and implemented with view to protecting popular
sovereignty and enhancing opportunities for self-determination.
This inevitably transforms the standard against which the
legitimacy of armed intervention is tested. Complying with the
strictures of the Charter or obtaining Security Council
authorization is no longer considered necessary for the legality
of uses of force. Rather, waging war is evaluated on the basis of
whether it increases “the probability of the free choice of
peoples about their government and political structure.”242 This
means that forceful intervention in the pursuit of popular
sovereignty may be undertaken not only to prevent mass
atrocities, but also to remove despotic regimes and promote
democracy.243

240. KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 507. These arguments were made during
hearings held by the ICJ regarding the case filed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
against NATO member states for their participation in the Kosovo War. It is noteworthy
that Belgium was the only NATO member state to justify its participation the conflict
on the basis of an emerging customary right to wage humanitarian war.
241. Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: Major Trends of
Development 1980-2010, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 460 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et. al. eds., 2010).
242. W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article
2(4), 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 642, 644 (1984).
243. W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 804–05 (1995); see ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 177–202 (1993); W. Michael Reisman, Why
Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 516 (1998).
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Uncertainties regarding the status of unauthorized
humanitarian war as a customary principle244 led some scholars
to argue that, despite having violated existing treaty-based and
customary international law, the Kosovo War may still have been
legitimate because it gave birth to a novel customary rule.245
Custom is defined as “general practice accepted as law.”246 This
definition is unpacked into two components: an objective
element formed of the actual practice of states; and a subjective
element consisting of a belief held by states that their practice
arises out of a sense of legal obligation.247 The claim that the
Kosovo War established a customary rule permitting unilateral
uses of force for humanitarian purposes is predicated on the
theory of “instant custom.”248 Despite the terminological
contradiction inherent in the phrase “instant custom,”249 this
theory is based on the claim that only a limited amount of state
practice needs to have accreted in a brief period of time to
satisfy the constituent elements of custom.250 Therefore, a single
244. For example, a memorandum prepared by the Planning Staff of the UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the permissibility of armed intervention noted
that “[t]he state practice to which advocates of the right of humanitarian intervention
have appealed provides an uncertain basis on which to rest such a right. . . . In fact, the
best case that can be made in support of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be
said to be unambiguously illegal.” Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materials on
International Law 1986, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 487, 618–19 (1986).
245. Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 23, 30 (1999) (observing that “it is not an exceptional occurrence that new
standards emerge as a result of a breach of lex lata”).
246. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to U.N. Charter).
247. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
23–25 (8th ed. 2012).
248. The theory was first proposed in: Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on
Outer Space: ‘“Instant’” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965).
249. Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272
RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 371 (1998).
250. Michael Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary
International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 440
(2010). In support of this theory, reference is usually made to the following segment of
the judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on
the basis of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it
might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially
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incident, such as the Kosovo War, if accepted, or at least not met
with considerable objections, could establish, even instantly, a
new customary rule.251
3. Necessity, Mitigation, and Absurdity
General international law recognizes that in certain
situations states may be compelled to violate international law to
protect essential interests from grave and imminent peril.252 The
doctrinal expression of this rule is the concept of necessity,
according to which these exceptional circumstances absolve
states of the wrongfulness resulting from their violation of
international law.253 Necessity, or variations thereof, has been
repeatedly invoked by supporters of a right to wage unilateral
humanitarian war. For example, speaking before the Security
Council during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the US
representative noted that Operation Allied Force was “necessary
to respond to Belgrade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar
Albanians. . . . We have begun today’s action to avert this
humanitarian catastrophe.”254 Similarly, the British Permanent
Representative declared that “[t]he action being taken is legal.
It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”255 Similar arguments
were also made during debates over the legality of military
intervention in the Syrian civil war in the absence of an
authorization from the Security Council.256
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense
of the provision invoked . . . .
Case Concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. (Feb. 20).
251. Sean Murphy, The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-Shaping Incident?, 94 PROC.
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 302, 303 (2000) (suggesting that analysts of the Kosovo War “must
consider the precedential value of Kosovo as a law-shaping incident”); see John Currie,
NATO’s Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo: Making or Breaking International Law?, 36
CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 303, 327 (1998).
252. Ian Johnstone, The Plea of ‘“Necessity”‘ in International Legal Discourse:
Humanitarian Intervention and Counter-terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 357
(2004).
253. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10,
2001, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts ILC
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
254. KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 425.
255. Id., at 429.
256. In a document released by the British Government outlining its position
regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria, it was argued that force may be used
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The central move made by proponents of this form of
justification is to invoke the exceptional nature of the
circumstances faced by NATO during the Kosovo conflict that
left no option but to resort to force without Security Council
approval. The history of the Milosevic regime, the conflict that
ravaged the Balkans during the early 1990s, the failure of
attempts at a political settlement between Belgrade and the
Kosovar Albanian leadership, the ethnic nature of the civil strife
in Kosovo, the documentation of grave crimes committed by
Serbian troops in Kosovo, and most significantly, the prospect of
a Russo-Chinese double veto in the Security Council against
proposals for forceful intervention were all case-specific facts
that converged to establish a situation of necessity that justified
the resort to force.257 Ultimately, “the unlawfulness of the act
was mitigated, to the point of exoneration, in the circumstances
in which it occurred.”258
In a sense, grounding the legitimacy of humanitarian war
on the doctrine of necessity mimics the absurdity doctrine that is
familiar in domestic legal systems.259 According to this doctrine,
the plain meaning of a legal instrument, be it the Constitution
or a statute, may be overturned if “the absurdity and injustice of
applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous, that
all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the
application.”260 Obviously, when drafting legal texts, legislators
do not intend to produce absurd or, in the Supreme Court’s
without Security Council authorization as “exceptional measures in” order to “alleviate
the scale of overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. . . . Such a legal basis is available
under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention . . . . ” Chemical Weapon Use By Syrian
Regime: UK Government Legal Position, UNITED KINGDOM (Aug. 29, 2013), https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-ukgovernment-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legalposition-html-version.
257. THE KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 170, at 173–75.
258. Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian
Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
DILEMMAS, supra note 200, at 204, 226 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert Keohane eds., 2003).
259. See Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative
Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick &
Robert S. Summers eds., 1991).
260. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 203 (1819); see also United States v.
Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868) (“All laws should receive a sensible construction.
General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice,
oppression, or an absurd consequence.”).
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just-quoted words, “monstrous” results. Nonetheless, absurdity
may occur because statutes are framed in general terms so as to
apply to future unforeseeable situations. Given the bounded
rationality of legislators and the imprecision of language,
generally framed texts may generate either over-specificity or
under-inclusiveness when applied in future settings that involve
previously unimagined fact-patterns or circumstances.261
Therefore, the absurdity doctrine enables courts to avoid
applying the plain meaning of generally framed legal texts if it
impinges on core social values.262 Scholars sympathetic towards
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo drew on the absurdity doctrine
to justify the intervention. A clear and plain reading of the UN
Charter, it was admitted, does not foresee the possibility of
resorting to force for humanitarian purposes without Security
Council approval. Nevertheless, complying with the strictures of
the Charter in situations of extreme humanitarian necessity,
such as the Kosovo conflict, would be an untenable reductio ad
absurdum, which justifies an exceptional departure from the
Charter-based jus ad bellum scheme.263
A noteworthy feature of legitimation on the bases of
necessity, mitigation, absurdity or similar concepts is their
relatively less consequential policy implications. The various
forms of lex specialis legitimation and lex generalis legitimation on
the grounds of either treaty provisions or customary law all
modify the rules governing the resort to force in international
relations. Whether one restricts the ambit of article 2(4),
invokes article 1(3), cites customary law existing in parallel to
the UN Charter, or contends that new custom has been
established, all of these justifications broaden the grounds on
which states may lawfully wage war. Invoking necessity,
mitigation, or absurdity, however, entails an admission of the
illegality of the resort to force without Security Council
261. See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Indeterminacy, in AUTHORITY REVISITED,
NOMAS XXIX 31–33 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1987).
262. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2402 (2002);
see also Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1007 (2006) (“If an
application of plain statutory language would undermine sufficiently important values
of the legal system, courts presume that the legislature would not have intended such a
result.”).
263. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS
AND ARMED ATTACKS 171–72 (2002).
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approval. In other words, this form of justification keeps the
Charter scheme essentially intact, but seeks exculpation for
specific cases in light of exceptional circumstances necessitating
the use of force to avoid an impending peril. This explains why
NATO member states and many scholars favored this approach
to justify the Kosovo War. Deconstructing the general
prohibition on the use of force enshrined in the Charter and
undermining the authority of the Security Council would
establish dangerous precedents that could be invoked by
adversaries in future settings, and could increase incidences of
violence in international relations. Therefore, many NATO
countries sought to downplay the precedential value of Kosovo
and insist that it represents a sui generis exception to what is
generally considered a valid system of law.264
C. Moral Legitimacy
If one person is able to save another and does not save him,
he transgresses the commandment ‘Neither shalt thou stand
idly by the blood of thy neighbor’
-Moshe ben Maimonides265

It is not inconceivable that in the operation of any legal
system cases may arise where the properly enacted laws prescribe
a certain course of action but where social morality, political
necessity, or economic efficiency point in different directions.266
In these circumstances, especially when the apparent conflict
pits the dictates of legality against the requirements of morality,
a troubling predicament appears. “[M]oral agents would have
good moral reasons for rejecting those claims of law that they
believe to be morally erroneous, just as law has good moral
reasons for imposing its legal will on those moral agents who,

264. Anthea Roberts, Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal But Justified?,
in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 195–96 (Philip Alston &
Euan MacDonald eds., 2008).
265. BRIAN LEPARD, RETHINKING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 90 (2002)
(quoting Moshe ben Maimonides).
266. Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717,
1728 (1988); see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1374 (1997) (“But at times, law requires us to do
things that we think morally wrong, or prohibits us from doing things that we think
morally correct.”).
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from the law’s perspective, mistakenly refuse to accept the law’s
wise guidance.”267 For countries and scholars who supported
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and called on the international
community to use force to protect civilians in Syria, and more
broadly for promoters of the humanitarian thesis, the moral
obligation to save civilians from mass atrocities overrides other
considerations, including legal niceties requiring Security
Council approval.268
The intellectual apparatus regularly employed to justify
unilateral humanitarian war on moral grounds is the just war
tradition,269 which is a “two thousand year old conversation
about the legitimacy of war.”270 Although most authors speak of
just war theory,271 I prefer the term the just war tradition which
reflects the broad variety of views and occasional inconsistencies
between writings in the field.272 Despite this diversity of
perspectives, the general normative project of the just war
tradition is to contain and limit violence in international affairs
through the identification of the circumstances in which waging
war would be morally permissible and outlining the conditions
for the just execution of war.273 Although numerous elements
267. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law’s Limited Domain Confronts
Morality’s Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1587 (2007); see Larry
Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 695–96 (1991).
268. For example, speaking to the nation on March 24, 1999, President Clinton
described the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and declared that “ending this
tragedy is a moral imperative.” See KRIEGER, supra note 180, at 415. Similarly, the
Secretary General of NATO announced that the alliance had a “moral duty” to
intervene in the Kosovo crisis. See id. at 304.
269. James Pattison, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, 26 ETHICS & INT’L
AFFAIRS 1, 4 (2011) (highlighting that discussions of the ethics of humanitarian
intervention “draw heavily on just war theory.”); see CORNELIU BJOLA, supra note 185, at
7 (“The prevalent ethical tradition addressing the moral conditions under with the use
of force can be legitimated is that of the just war theory.”).
270. ALEX BELLAMY, JUST WARS: FROM CICERO TO IRAQ 2 (2006).
271. See, e.g., NICHOLAS FOTION, WAR AND ETHICS: A NEW JUST WAR THEORY
(2007).
272. See Anthony Coates, Humanitarian Intervention: A Conflict of Traditions, in
XLVII NOMOS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 58, 59 (Terry Nardin & Melissa Williams
eds., 2005).
273. In other words, just war theory examines the morality of war from two angels.
The first is judging the morality of waging war, while the second is evaluating whether
war was conducted morally. This bifurcation of the questions examined by the just war
tradition mimics the division of the body of international law dealing with armed
conflict into a field relating to the legality of resorting to war; namely, jus ad bellum, and
a field dealing with the means and methods of war, which is jus in bello. See STEVEN P.
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have been proposed as criteria for evaluating the moral
permissibility of waging war, three core indicators appear to
enjoy the unanimous support of just war theorists. These are (1)
just cause, (2) right intention, and (3) proper authority.274
The first of these criteria, just cause, is understood as “a
sufficient reason for war, a goal or ‘cause’ capable of justifying
the terrible forms of action that war inevitably involves.”275
Classical and modern writings in the just war tradition have
proposed a broad range of causes justifying the resort to war,
such as self-defense, deterring aggression, avenging wrongs, and
protecting rights. Another just cause for waging war that has
long been recognized by the just war tradition is saving foreign
citizens from mass atrocities.276 A degree of uncertainty,
however, surrounds the nature and gravity of the atrocities
warranting forceful intervention. For some scholars, the threat
or perpetration of crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity constitute just causes for war, while
others adopt the significantly lower threshold of preventing
abuses of basic human rights.277
Cognizant of the possibility that the existence of a just cause
may be exploited to justify war waged for ulterior political
motives, just war theorists developed the second component of
this triad: right intention. Classically, right intent was

LEE, ETHICS AND WAR 31 (2012). As discussed above, this Article does not examine jus
in bello, and therefore, this Section will not examine debates about the moral
justifiability of NATO’s conduct of military operations.
274. These three criteria were formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas on the basis of
the earlier writings of St. Augustine. See DINSTEIN, supra note 117, at 66. Other
principles that have been identified by just war theorists and that have been applied in
discussion on the legitimacy of humanitarian war include: (1) Last resort in the sense
that other peaceful forms of intervention should either be exhausted or be deemed
ineffective, (2) the use of force should produce more good than harm, (3) proportionality
should be maintained between the objectives of the operations and the means used,
and (4) reasonable prospects of success in ending human suffering. See Nicholas Wheeler,
Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures, 2 MELB. J. INT’L L. 550,
556–60 (2001).
275. Jeff McMahan, Just War, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 88, at 669, 670.
276. Gregory Reichberg, Jus ad Bellum, in WAR: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY,
23 (Larry May ed., 2009).
277. See David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 173–76
(1980) (proposing the protection of socially necessary human rights as a just cause of
war).
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understood as the requirement that war be waged with the
intention of correcting evil or rectifying a wrong.278 In other
words, a war waged in response to the just cause of a
humanitarian crisis but with the intention of, for example,
territorial aggrandizement, regime change, or assisting a
particular belligerent, may be deemed unjust war for being
fought for the wrong objectives.279 It was, therefore, unsurprising
that British Prime Minister Tony Blair partially justified NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo by stating that “[t]his is a just war, based
not on any territorial ambitions but on values.”280
The third element of just war theory, proper authority, is
perhaps its most pivotal component.281 Faced with the potential
for abuse generated by the indeterminacy inherent in just cause,
right intent, and other just war criteria, theorists recognized the
importance of identifying a centralized authority to ascertain
whether the just war conditions have been met and to authorize
the use of force. In classical iterations of just war theory, that
authority was the sovereign or the ruling prince.282
Identifying the entity empowered to authorize waging
humanitarian war was probably the most contentious aspect of
the debate over the Kosovo War. Indeed, as discussed above,
requiring Security Council approval to intervene to protect
civilians has been the feature of the Charter-based jus ad bellum

278. STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS, 51 (2005).
279. David Chandler, The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace, 11
INT’L PEACEKEEPING 59, 70 (2004).
280. Tom Buerkle, Blair Grabs Role as Alliance Hawk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1999,
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/24/news/24iht-blair.2.t.html
281. Laurie Calhoun, Legitimate Authority and ‘Just War’ in the Modern World, 27
PEACE & CHANGE 37, 54 (2002) (explaining that because the other components of just
war theory “are subject to rational dispute, legitimate authority becomes, in actual
practice, the sole necessary condition for a nation’s waging of war”).
282. Farer, supra note 200, at 76 (explaining that St. Thomas Aquinas included
proper authority among the just war criteria “to limit violence and strengthen order by
delegitimating the use of force by lords all up and down the medieval hierarchy as well
as outlaw groups—pirates and unemployed mercenaries, for example”). Aquinas’
rationale for identifying sovereigns as the sole authority capable of sanctioning the use
of force also reflects the unique role ascribed to sovereigns in Aquinas’ political
philosophy. The right of the sovereign to authorize the use of force to avenge wrongs
or punish evildoers is an extension of the broader responsibility of the sovereign to
serve and protect the common good of the community. See James Turner Johnson,
Aquinas and Luther on War and Peace: Sovereign Authority and the Use of Armed Force, 31 J.
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 3, 10 (2003).
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scheme subjected to the greatest criticism by proponents of the
humanitarian thesis. Therefore, numerous alternatives to
Security Council approval were proposed. For example, Michael
Walzer, a leading contemporary scholar of the just war tradition,
argued that morality does not proscribe “unilateral action, so
long as there is no immediate alternative available” and
concluded that “any state capable of stopping the slaughter has
the right, at least, to try to do so.”283 Uncomfortable with the
prospect of abuse entailed in an open license for all states to
wage unilateral humanitarian war, some scholars proposed
limiting this right to democratic states or states that protect basic
human rights.284 Meanwhile, mindful of the unique legitimacy of
decisions adopted in accordance with the formal procedures of
multilateral organizations, such as NATO or the African Union,
some opined that armed intervention for humanitarian
purposes executed by these organizations would overcome the
dangers of unfettered unilateralism.285 Another institutional
option that was proposed to legitimate armed intervention to
protect civilians is for the intervening state or coalition of states
to accept ex post facto international judicial review exercised by
the ICJ and/or the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).286
D. RtoP-Humanity’s Version
As aforementioned, a common thread running throughout
these three categories of legitimation is that they seek to revisit
the rules governing the resort to force by states in international
relations to permit unilateral forceful intervention to protect
civilians from mass atrocities. In other words, the gap that the
Kosovo War had uncovered between legality as expressed in the
UN Charter and an emergent humanitarian legitimacy was to be

283. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 107–08 (4th ed. 2006).
284. Terry Nardin, The Moral Basis for Humanitarian Intervention, in JUST
INTERVENTION 1, 22 (Anthony Lang ed., 2003); see also Allen Buchanan & Robert
Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS &
INT’L AFFAIRS 1, 18–19 (2004).
285. Ruth Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 832
(1999).
286. Jonathan Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 834, 838 (1999).
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bridged by transforming the former to reflect the requirements
of the latter.287
For many supporters of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo,
and more broadly, for proponents of the humanitarian thesis,
the most effective approach for achieving this objective was to
formulate and codify criteria to both guide international
intervention and provide a standard against which to test the
legitimacy of these interventions. The impulse underlying these
calls to set criteria to guide the use of force for humanitarian
purposes appears to be the fear of the misuse of an unregulated
right of unilateral intervention and a faith in the ability of
codified rules to shape both state policies and the actions of
international institutions.288
Although countless sets of checklists and criteria were
proposed by some governments289 and many scholars,290 the
most prominent effort to devise guidelines to govern
international intervention in humanitarian crises was the
concept of the Responsibility to Protect (“RtoP”) that was first
proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and
287. Allen Buchanan, Reforming International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, supra note
200, at 131.
288. Jane Stormseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS ,
supra note 200, at 245.
289. Great Britain was among the leading advocates of adopting guidelines to
determine the appropriateness of forceful intervention to protect civilians. For
example, Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed a series of questions to guide decisions
to intervene in humanitarian crises. These included: (1) Whether the intervening
nations were sure of their case? (2) Whether diplomatic options had been exhausted?
(3) Whether resorting to force is sensible and prudent? (4) Is there an exit strategy in
place? (5) Are there national interests involved in the conflict? See The Right
Honorable Tony Blair, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Address at the Chicago
Economic Club (Apr. 22, 1999), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html. Australia’s Foreign Minister, Gareth
Evans, proposed a similar checklist that closely resembled the core components of just
war theory. See Gareth Evans, When Is it Right to Fight?, 46 SURVIVAL 59, 75 (2004).
290. See Alexander Volsky, Reconciling Human Rights and State Sovereignty, Justice
and the Law, in Humanitarian Interventions, 3 INT’L PUB. POL’Y REV. 40, 44–45 (2007);
Mona Fixdal & Dan Smith, Humanitarian Intervention and Just War, 42 MERSHON INT’L
STUD. REV. 283 (1998); Ian Holliday, Ethics of Intervention: Just War Theory and the
Challenge of the 21st Century, 17 INT’L REL. 115 (2003); David Fisher, The Ethics of
Intervention, 36 SURVIVAL 51 (1994); George R. Lucas Jr., The Role of the ‘International
Community’ in Just War Tradition—Confronting the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention
and Preemptive War, 2 J. MIL. ETHICS 122 (2003).
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State Sovereignty (“ICISS”).291 Because the report issued by this
commission has been thoroughly described, analyzed,
applauded, and criticized in earlier works,292 discussion will be
limited here to outlining its salient features and identifying the
changes it proposed to the existing jus ad bellum scheme.
RtoP, as proposed by the ICISS, is predicated on two
theoretical moves. The first is the recasting of sovereignty from
control to responsibility. Under the classical Westphalian
framework described earlier in this Article, the state was
presumed to enjoy limitless powers over individuals within its
jurisdiction. The ICISS, however, argued that the emergence
and growth of international human rights law and state practice
since World War II upended this conception, thereby
warranting the remolding of sovereignty into a responsibility of
governments to uphold the rights and freedoms of their
subjects.293 Second, RtoP shifted the debate from a right of
intervention exercised by states to a responsibility towards
individuals facing the threat of mass atrocities.294 While under
the Westphalian anarchical image of the world states were
viewed as autonomous, coequal sovereigns, this redefined

291. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (International Development Research Center,
2002)[hereinafter ICISS Report].
292. See Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 91
FOREIGN AFF. 99 (2002); RAMESH THAKUR, THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE AND SECURITY:
FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 245–86 (2006);
THOMAS WEISS & DON HUBERT, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RESEARCH,
BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND BACKGROUND (International Development Research Center, 2001);
Ramesh Thakur, Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect:
Experiences from the ICISS, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 323 (2002); Jeremy Levitt, The
Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without a Dam? 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 153 (2003)
(reviewing INT’L COMM. ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) & THOMAS WEISS & DON HUBERT, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND (2001)); Jennifer
Welsh et al., The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 57 INT’L J. 489 (2002); Edward Newman,
Humanitarian Intervention, Legality and Legitimacy, 6 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 102 (2002);
Ramesh Thakur, A Shared Responsibility for a More Secure World, 11 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
281 (2005); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Responsibility to Peace: A Critique of R2P, J.
INTERVENTION & STATEBUILDING 39 (2010).
293. Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: From an Idea to an International
Norm, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 19 (Richard Cooper & Juliette Kohler eds., 2008).
294. Id.

2014]

THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM

619

conception of sovereignty proposed a world order in which
states are dually responsible for the protection of individuals
within their jurisdiction before their own citizenry and the
international community.295
These moves, the Commission opined, are in line with the
transformation of international relations “from a culture of
violence to a more enlightened culture of peace,” which was
spawned by the expansion of international human rights,
humanitarian, and criminal law. These developments in
international relations and international law ultimately
discredited traditional understandings of security defined in
terms of national borders and raison d’état, and gave rise to
human security as an overarching paradigm through which to
evaluate and determine security policy.296
Having laid its intellectual foundations, which recreate
many of the claims advanced by the constitutionalist and
humanitarian theses in international law, the ICISS then
outlined the policy components of RtoP. Primarily, ICISS
emphasized that armed intervention is merely one of many tools
available for responding to humanitarian crises. These tools
were presented as a broad continuum of options ranging from
preventive diplomacy to post-conflict reconstruction.297 Second,
drawing heavily on the just war tradition, the ICISS proposed six
criteria to guide international intervention in situations where
civilians face the threat of mass atrocities. The just causes for
intervention identified by the ICISS were situations of actual or
apprehended large-scale loss of life, whether it was the result of
state action, neglect, inability, or a failed state situation, and
actual or apprehended ethnic cleansing.298 These circumstances,
the report clarified, may occur due to the commission of crimes
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or due to
the breakdown of a state’s institutions, the eruption of a civil
war, or the occurrence of a natural or environmental disaster. In
these situations, it would be legitimate for the international

295.
296.
297.
298.

ICISS Report, supra note 2901, at 13.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 32–33.
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community to forcefully intervene both anticipatorily and to
stop ongoing atrocities.299
As to the right intention underlying forceful intervention,
the report noted that the “primary purpose of the intervention
must be to halt or avert human suffering,”300 thereby excluding
regime change and territorial occupation as legitimate
objectives of humanitarian war. The ICISS was cognizant,
however, that domestic constituencies may require governments
not use force except when necessary to serve national selfinterests. Therefore, the report advocated a conception of
‘national’ interests that is both expansive and infused with a
distinctive cosmopolitan flavor that would include matters of
global concern, and argued that “these days, good international
citizenship is a matter of national self-interest.”301
The report’s third criterion for judging the legitimacy of
armed humanitarian intervention is the requirement that force
be employed as a last resort after peaceful measures had been
explored. The fourth component of these criteria required that
the force used be proportionate to the humanitarian objective
of the intervention. Fifth, the report noted that the use of force
would only be legitimate if it had reasonable prospects of
succeeding in halting or preventing the loss of life.302
The sixth and final criterion for determining the legitimacy
of the use of force presented the greatest challenge to the
existing jus ad bellum scheme. Seeking to identify the entity
empowered to authorize waging humanitarian war, the ICISS
noted that “there is no better or more appropriate body than
the Security Council to deal with military intervention issues for
human protection purposes. It is the Security Council which
should be making the hard decisions in the hard cases about
overriding state sovereignty.”303 With Rwanda and Kosovo still
recent history, however, the ICISS realized that Council’s
unfettered powers and the unmatched influence of the P5 might

299. Id. at 33. It is noteworthy that ICISS excluded intervention both to prevent
less egregious forms of human rights violations and to protect or install democratically
elected regimes.
300. Id. at 35.
301. Id. at 36.
302. Id. at 37.
303. Id. at 49.
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undermine its ability to effectively intervene to prevent mass
atrocities. Therefore, the report advanced a number of
proposals that alter the fundamental features of the UN Charter
scheme.
First, the P5 were encouraged to adopt an informal code of
conduct according to which they would practice what was
dubbed “constructive abstention,” whereby they would avoid
using their vetoes to obstruct Council action in humanitarian
crises.304 Second, the report argued that the responsibility of the
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security
required effective and prompt intervention in situations involving
large-scale loss of human life. Third, aware of the possibility that
divergent interests among the P5 might lead the Council to
deadlock, the report proposed resorting to two alternative
institutions for securing approval for humanitarian war. The first
was the General Assembly, which may legitimatly authorize the
resort to armed force for humanitarian purposes through the
Uniting for Peace mechanism. A second alternative was for
regional organizations to intervene in humanitarian crises and
seek ex post facto Security Council approval.
Although these institutional aspects of the ICISS report
represent the most obvious refashioning of the jus ad bellum
scheme, the import and impact of the earlier five criteria should
not be underappreciated. As described earlier, the drafters of
the UN Charter envisaged the Security Council as an
omnipotent body enjoying considerable discretion in deciding
the appropriate policies to discharge its duties. Nothing,
whether in the Charter or elsewhere, compels the Council to
either deliberate on or respond to any crisis or conflict,
including situations causing significant human suffering.
However, adopting a set of just war-like criteria, even if worded
in indeterminate terms such as “large-scale loss of life,”
“proportionate means,” or “reasonable prospects of success,”
diminishes the Council’s margin of appreciation. Such terms
would invariably affect and shape debates on the Council and
place pressure on its members to authorize intervention in
humanitarian emergencies.305 In essence, the ICISS guidelines
304. Id. at 51.
305. Indeed, the co-chair of the ICISS, Gareth Evans, noted that these guidelines
were proposed on the understanding that: “[T]he existence of agreed criteria would
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would “lead to the ‘Gulliverization’ of the use of force by major
global and regional powers, tying it with numerous threads of
global norms and rules. Absent R2P, they have relatively more
freedom, not less, to do what they want.”306
This transformation in the modus operandi of the Security
Council fits well with the global constitutionalist project and the
humanitarian thesis, which is why I call this scheme proposed by
the ICISS: RtoP-Humanity’s Version. For advocates of these
approaches, the Security Council should not function as a Great
Power oligarchy dedicated to ensuring the peaceful coexistence
of territorially disjointed coequal sovereign states. Rather, the
United Nations, with the Council at its core, is perceived as an
institutional apparatus committed to safeguarding the values
and interests of a global community of humankind.307 And much
like the executive branch of national governments, in
discharging its duties the Council is not legibus solutus. “[I]n a
constitutionalizing international system, the traditional view of
Security Council actions in a basically law-free realm is no longer
tenable.”308 Instead, the Council becomes law-bound to uphold
and promote communal values at the apex of which is the
protection of human dignity.309
Almost immediately, RtoP-Humanity’s Version attracted
considerable academic attention and won important political
endorsements, the most prominent of which came in a 2004
report prepared by a High-Level Panel appointed by the UN
Secretary General to examine contemporary sources of global
change the nature of Security Council debate: Maximize the possibility of achieving
council consensus around when it is appropriate or not to go to war; maximize
international support for whatever it decides; and minimize the possibility of individual
member states bypassing or ignoring it.” Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention
to the Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 711 (2006).
306. Ramesh Thakur & Thomas Weiss, R2P: From Idea to Norm—and Action?, 1
GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 22, 47 (2009).
307. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 17, at 358.
308. Anne Peters, The Responsibility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Legal
Consequences for the UN Security Council and its Members, in FROM BILATERALISM TO
COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 297,
307.
309. See von Bogdandy, supra note 82, at 240; see also Carlo Focarelli, The
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a
Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 191, 199 (2008) (“One is led to take
for granted that the rationale of the responsibility to protect is respect for human
dignity as a supreme value.”).

2014]

THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM

623

insecurity, and then from Kofi Annan himself in his report
submitted to the 60th Session of the General Assembly. In the
former report, most features of the ICISS report were replicated.
First, although not openly jettisoning state security in favor of
human security, the High-Level Panel emphasized the
importance of taking the latter into consideration during the
policy-making process at the United Nations.310 Second, the
High-Level Panel adopted five of the six criteria proposed by the
ICISS to determine the legitimacy of armed humanitarian
intervention. The situations warranting armed intervention were
identified as actual or apprehended harm to state or human
security, and conflicts involving “genocide and other large-scale
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international
humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended.”311 The
purpose of intervention should be limited to halting or averting
the threat to state or human security, and the scale, duration,
and intensity of armed action should be restricted to the
necessary means to achieve that purpose. Force should also be
employed only as a last resort, and only after it had been
determined that intervention stands a reasonable chance of
success.312 In addition, the High-Level Panel advised the General
Assembly and the Security Council to officially endorse these
guidelines through declaratory resolutions.
On the all-important question of legitimate authority,
however, the High-Level Panel diverged from RtoP-Humanity’s
Version and reaffirmed faith in the Security Council as
“international community’s collective security voice.”313
Alternative forums for authorizing the use of force for
humanitarian purposes were not entertained, thereby preserving
a core component of the classical jus ad bellum scheme.
Nonetheless, the High-Level Panel called on the P5 to refrain
from exercising their veto on resolutions dealing with situations
of genocide or large-scale human rights abuses, thereby limiting
the prerogatives of the Great Powers.
310. Throughout the report, reference is made to both concepts as if to indicate
that state and human security are two different approaches to security both of which
should be considered in devising policies to confront sources of insecurity. See, e.g.,
UNSG High-Level Panel Report, supra note 119, at 11.
311. Id. at 85–86.
312. See id.
313. Id. at 55.
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In his report, the UN Secretary General lauded the reports
prepared by the ICISS and the High-Level Panel and
encouraged the UN member states to embrace RtoP.314
Substantively, the Secretary General closely followed the lead of
the High-Level Panel, proposed guidelines for Security Council
intervention that mirrored those advanced by the panel, and
avoided offering alternative institutions to authorize the use of
force. Unlike the ICISS and the High-Level Panel, however, the
Secretary General did not call on the P5 to refrain from using
the veto in matters relating to mass atrocities.315
***
To conclude this Part, what the preceding typology of the
legitimacies of humanitarian war reveals is that by mid-2005 the
world was presented with a broad selection, or, if you may, a
menu, of approaches that justify the resort to force to prevent
mass atrocities. Albeit to varying degrees, all these legitimacies
entailed revising the doctrinal and institutional structure of jus
ad bellum. Whether one applies lex specialis legitimation to shrink
the general prohibition on the use of force, or adopts lex
generalis legitimation to argue that either customary law or
necessity permit waging humanitarian war, or uses just-war
criteria to justify armed intervention to prevent mass atrocities,
the result is the transformation of jus ad bellum. Moreover, not
only did realigning jus ad bellum to permit waging humanitarian
war enjoy considerable enthusiasm in western scholarly and nongovernmental circles, but it also attracted palpable support from
the global diplomatic officialdom.
Moreover, unlike other proposed modifications to the rules
governing the resort to force by states, and there were many
both before and after Kosovo,316 these legitimacies of
humanitarian war also represent an attempt at strategic social
construction. As described above, jus ad bellum is a prime
expression of the policy objectives and values of the law of
coexistence, the purpose, or telos, of which is preserving peace
314. See U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security,
and Human Rights for All, 35, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter In
Larger Freedom].
315. See id. at 33.
316. See: Olivier Corten, The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of
Force: A Methodological Debate, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 803 (2006).
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between states in an anarchic world. Arguments justifying
humanitarian war and advocating RtoP-Humanity’s Version are,
however, manifestations of the broader political project seeking
to transform international relations from an anarchic statist
order to a global community of humankind predicated on
universal values and the rule of law.317
Ultimately, however, as I argue in the next and final Part of
this Article, this bid at strategic social construction failed. A
conscious decision was made to reject RtoP-Humanity’s Version,
and to reaffirm the existing rules, institutions, and statist values
of jus ad bellum.
III. RTOP-REALPOLITIK, GREAT POWER CONCERT, AND THE
LIMITS OF HUMANITARIANISM
The decision that I alluded to in the conclusion of the
previous Part was taken at the 2005 World Summit, which was
held at the opening of the 60th Session of the UN General
Assembly.318 At its conclusion, the Summit adopted—by
consensus—the World Summit Outcome Document (“WSOD”),
which dealt with a wide range of global issues and problems.319
Perhaps the most important sections of this document, or at
least the ones that attracted the most scholarly attention and
journalistic praise,320 were those dealing with the appropriate
international reaction to humanitarian crises, which appear
under the section titled “Responsibility to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.”
This section of the WSOD represents the culmination of
the global governmental and academic debate on the legality,
legitimacy, and appropriateness of waging war for humanitarian
317. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Advancing the Responsibility to Protect Through International
Criminal Justice, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL MORAL COMPACT OF THE
21ST CENTURY, supra note 293, at 38–39.
318. The Summit was described as the “largest gathering of world leaders in
history.” See Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson of the Secretary General,
UNITED NATIONS (July 6, 2005), http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2005/
db050706.doc.htm
319. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, UN Doc. A/Res/60/1,
(Sept. 16, 2005).
320. Ian Williams, Annan Has Paid His Dues, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 19, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2005/sep/20/mainsection.commentanddebate2.
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purposes sparked by the Kosovo War. As discussed earlier,
NATO’s armed intervention in Kosovo was widely considered to
have been legitimate despite having violated international law.
To many commentators this demonstrated the need to revisit
the tenets of jus ad bellum, which reflected an anachronistic law
of coexistence, to bring it in line with an emergent
humanitarian legitimacy. Attempts to bridge this gap between
legality and legitimacy gave rise to the various legitimacies of
humanitarian war catalogued in the previous Part. The most
prominent proposal for justifying the resort to war to prevent
mass human suffering was what I called RtoP-Humanity’s Version,
which not only enjoyed broad scholarly support, but also
attracted endorsements from a number of governments and the
UN Secretary General, who in his report submitted to the World
Summit appealed to UN member states to “embrace the
responsibility to protect, and when necessary, we must act on
it.”321
At the 2005 World Summit, however, RtoP-Humanity’s
Version and all the other forms of legitimation that were
proposed in the aftermath of Kosovo were rejected. Instead, an
emasculated version of RtoP was adopted, which essentially kept
the doctrinal architecture and institutional infrastructure of jus
ad bellum intact. “The UN World Summit came to the very
striking conclusion that no reform of the Charter provisions on
collective security was needed.”322
This becomes readily apparent once the relevant
paragraphs of the WSOD are unpacked.323 As demonstrated in
the table below, the various components of RtoP-Humanity’s
Version that challenged the classical rules governing the resort to
force were either modified or entirely dropped.324 First, the
321. In Larger Freedom, supra note 314, para. 135.
322. Gray, supra note 129, at 91–92.
323. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 319, paras. 138, 139, 140.
324. Interestingly, a number of authors who commented on RtoP as it appeared
in the World Summit Outcome Document (“WSOD”) stated that the document
avoided including any specific criteria to guide international intervention in
humanitarian crises. See e.g., Nicholas Wheeler, A Victory for Common Humanity? The
Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit, 2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 95, 100
(2005) (noting that the opposition of some states to the inclusion of criteria “killed any
attempt to develop agreed guidelines at the summit.”). I disagree with this assessment.
Paragraph 139 of the WSOD clearly includes criteria that determine the situations
justifying the resort to force, require the exhaustion of peaceful means, identify a
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categories of situations warranting resorting to war were
narrowed to four specific crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Gone was the broader
language proposed by the ICISS and the High-Level Panel that
would have required armed intervention to stop large-scale
losses of life, regardless of whether they amounted to these
crimes, and that also included natural and environmental
disasters.
Second, the WSOD avoided indicating when intervention
was required. Earlier versions of RtoP explicitly called for armed
intervention in situations where loss of life was either
apprehended or actually occurring. Third, whereas RtoPHumanity’s Version envisaged international armed intervention in
cases where mass atrocities were imputable to direct state
involvement, negligence or inability to protect civilians, or
failed-state situations, the WSOD hinged the resort to force on
demonstrating that national authorities were “manifestly failing”
to protect civilians. Fourth, according to the WSOD, force would
only be contemplated “should peaceful means be inadequate,”
which is language that grants greater flexibility to the
intervening powers than that suggested by both the ICISS and
the High-Level Panel. Fifth, no mention was made in the WSOD
of either the need to maintain proportionality between the
humanitarian objectives of an intervention and the means
adopted to execute the operation or the importance of ensuring
that the protection of civilians was the principal intention of the
intervening powers.
Sixth, the language and tenor of RtoP-Humanity’s Version
appear to confer on the international community a duty to
intervene in situations where states fail to uphold their
responsibility to protect civilians against mass atrocities. The
WSOD, however, “points towards a voluntary, not mandatory,
engagement . . . which again stands in contrast to the

certain level of state involvement in atrocities to warrant intervention, and, most
importantly, that identify the Security Council as the sole entity empowered to
authorize the resort to force. The difference between these criteria and those
enshrined in both the ICISS and High-Level Panel reports is that they essentially
replicate the existing rules of jus ad bellum.
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assumption of a systematic duty.”325 This conclusion is gleaned
from the noticeable difference in the nature of the international
community’s commitment to, on the one hand, intervene
peacefully to prevent mass atrocities, and on the other, to use
armed force in these situations. The WSOD indicates that the
international community bears a responsibility to intervene
through peaceful means to prevent the perpetration of the four
crimes mentioned above. If peaceful measures fail, however, the
international community no longer bears a responsibility to
intervene, but is only “prepared to take collective action . . . on a
case-by-case basis.”326 In other words, according to the WSOD,
should a situation arise—think of Libya, Syria, or similar
conflicts—where genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
or ethnic cleansing occurs, nothing obliges the United Nations,
the Security Council, or the international community at large to
forcefully intervene to stop ongoing atrocities.
Seventh, on the fundamental question of the body
empowered to authorize the use of force to prevent or halt the
perpetration of mass human rights violations, the WSOD
unequivocally identified the Security Council as the sole entity
enjoying that prerogative, thereby rejecting all the institutional
alternatives that were proposed in the ICISS report.
Furthermore, unlike the ICISS and High-Level Panel reports,
the WSOD did not call on the P5 to refrain from exercising their
veto power when voting on resolutions intended to authorize
international intervention to prevent mass atrocities.

325. Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal
Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99, 109 (2007).
326. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 319, para. 139 (emphasis added).
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RtoP: From Humanity to Realpolitik

Just Cause

RtoP-Humanity’s Version

RtoP-Realpolitik

Actual of apprehended
large-scale loss of life, with
or without genocidal intent.

Genocide.

Large scale “ethnic
cleansing,” actual or
apprehended, whether
carried out by killing,
forced expulsion, acts of
terror or rape.

Crimes against
humanity.
War crimes.
Ethnic cleansing.

Situations of state collapse
and the resultant exposure
of the population to mass
starvation and/or civil war.

Level of State
Involvement in
Atrocities

Last Resort

Overwhelming natural or
environmental
catastrophes, where the
state concerned is either
unwilling or unable to
cope, or call for assistance,
and significant loss of life is
occurring or threatened.
“[D]eliberate state action,
or state neglect or inability
to act, or a failed state
situation . . . .”
“Every diplomatic and nonmilitary avenue . . . must
have been explored . . .
there must be reasonable
grounds for believing that,
in all circumstances, it the
measure had been

“[N]ational
authorities are
manifestly failing to
protect their
populations . . . .”
“. . . should
peaceful means be
inadequate . . .”
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Right Intention

Proportionality

Nature of the
Obligation

Proper Authority

attempted it would not have
succeeded . . . .”
“The primary purpose of
the intervention must be to
halt or avert human
suffering.”
“The scale, duration and
intensity of the planned
military intervention should
be the minimum necessary
to secure the humanitarian
objective in question.”
The international
community has a “fallback
responsibility” to protect
when states are unable or
unwilling to fulfill their
responsibility to protect.
“[T]here are exceptional
circumstances in which the
very interest that all states
have in maintaining a stable
international order requires
them to react.”
UN Security Council +
Encouraging P5 not to
exercise veto power in
humanitarian crises.
UN General Assembly
through the Uniting for
Peace mechanism.
Regional organizations +
Seeking ex post facto
authorization.

No mention of right
intention.

No mention of
proportionality.

The international
community is
“prepared to take
collective action …”
“[O]n a case-by-case
basis”

UN Security
Council only.
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The tale of the twists and turns of the negotiations at the
World Summit that led to this outcome, which as
aforementioned was adopted by consensus, has been told
elsewhere and need not be recounted here in full.327 A few
observations, however, are noteworthy. First, contrary to popular
perception,328 the debate over RtoP did not pit liberal western
democracies eager to secure maximum protection for human
rights against illiberal states or former colonies resistant to any
diminution of their sovereignty. The picture is more complex.329
Those aspects of RtoP-Humanity’s Version that challenged the
existing jus ad bellum scheme were jettisoned due to reservations
expressed by Great Powers, western and non-western
democracies, illiberal states, and small underdeveloped
countries. Second, despite the fact that it was the fear of a
double Russo-Chinese veto that led NATO to launch Operation
Allied Force without seeking Security Council approval, the P5,
regardless of their domestic regime-type, were unanimous in
rejecting any constraints on their freedom to exercise their
coveted veto power.330 Third, although the Rwandan genocide
demonstrated that occasionally it is not the threat of a P5 veto
but rather international apathy and a lack of political will that
lead to human tragedies,331 the overwhelming majority of
countries rejected proposals to make armed intervention in
humanitarian crises mandatory. For powers with forceprojection capabilities necessary for waging humanitarian war, a
hard-and-fast rule requiring intervention to prevent mass
atrocities would have placed the burden of responding to these
crises on these countries and would have subjected them to
increased pressure to intervene in situations where their
327. A thorough and well-written account appears in ALEX BELLAMY,
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 83–91 (2009).
328. See e.g., Claire Applegarth & Andrew Block, Acting Against Atrocities: A Strategy
for Supporters of the Responsibility to Protect 26 (Kennedy School of Government, Belfer
Ctr. Student Paper Series #09-03), available at, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/xstandard/Student%20discussion%20paper%200903%20full.pdf
329. See: Edward Luck, Sovereignty, Choice, and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 GLOBAL
RESP. TO PROTECT 10, 11 (2009).
330. Alex Bellamy, Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention
and the 2005 World Summit, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 143, 164 (2006).
331. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2003); ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF
HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004).
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interests are not necessarily implicated. Smaller nations also
expressed concerns regarding an expansive version of RtoP. On
the other hand, For many of these countries, codifying an
obligation to forcefully prevent mass atrocities could be misused
by powerful countries to intervene in their internal affairs.332
Fourth, the vast majority of countries333 were reluctant to
contemplate granting any institution other than the Security
Council the power to authorize the resort to force for
humanitarian purposes. For Russia and China, this would have
significantly devalued their P5 status, while for smaller states,
insisting on Security Council approval was a mechanism to
guard against western interventionism.334
In essence, therefore, we had come full circle. In
September 1999, Kofi Annan called for the development of a
strategy that would both guarantee effective action to forestall
humanitarian tragedies caused by international complacency,
such as the Rwandan genocide, while avoiding undermining the
post-World War II international legal order as NATO’s illegal
intervention in Kosovo threatened to do. After an extended
diplomatic and academic debate during which numerous
approaches to justify humanitarian war were proposed, in 2005 a
choice was made to reaffirm and endorse the jus ad bellum

332. Andreas Zimmerman, The Obligation to Prevent Genocide: Towards a General
Responsibility to Protect?, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, supra note 85, at 629, 631–32. The US position in this
regard was the clearest. In a letter addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the
UN member states, US Ambassador John Bolton stated:
[T]he Charter has never been interpreted as creating a legal obligation for
Security Council members to support enforcement action in various cases
involving serious breaches of international peace . . . We do not accept that
either the United Nations as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual
states, have an obligation to intervene under international law. We also
believe that what the United Nations does in a particular situation should
depend on the specific circumstances. Accordingly, we should avoid language
that focuses on the obligation or responsibility of the international
community and instead assert that we are prepared to take action.
Letter from Ambassador John Bolton, United States, to UN Permanent Representatives
(Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with author).
333. The Untied States and United Kingdom, however, adopted the position that
the unilateral use of force is not proscribed by international law. The impact of this
position does not appear in the paragraphs relating to RtoP, but in paragraphs 79 and
80 on the Security Council’s role in authorizing the use of force.
334. BELLAMY, supra note 166, at 83.
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scheme as enshrined in the UN Charter.335 In other words,
should a situation arise where incontrovertible evidence
indicates that mass atrocities are being perpetrated, such as
Darfur or the Syrian civil war,336 forceful intervention to protect
civilians remains, as it was since 1945, dependent on the
approval of the Security Council, which ultimately hinges on the
consent of the P5. This is why I call the version of RtoP adopted
by the 2005 World Summit: RtoP-Realpolitik.
Despite the deliberate choice that RtoP-Realpolitik
represents in favor of the existing rules and institutions of jus ad
bellum that are predicated on the values and purposes of the law
of coexistence, many scholars applauded the adoption of RtoP
by the World Summit and portrayed it as evidence of the
humanization of international law and global affairs. So much so
that RtoP has been described as the “most dramatic normative
development of our time,”337 as embodying “an emerging
constitutional norm,”338 and even as portending a “revolution in
the consciousness of international relations.”339 These
celebratory appraisals of RtoP, much like rejectionist views that
condemn this concept as an attempt to resuscitate bygone
pretexts for western colonization,340 are unwarranted.341 Not

335. William Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE PROMISE OF STOPPING MASS ATROCITIES IN OUR TIME
27 (Jared Genser & Irwin Cotler eds., 2012).
336. On the conflict in Darfur, see REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1564 (2004), available at http://
www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (concluding that the Government
of Sudan was responsible for acts that may amount to crimes against humanity and war
crimes, and finding that rebel forces also perpetrated violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law that may amount to war crimes). On the conflict in Syria,
see what, at the time of this writing, is the latest report prepared by a Commission of
Inquiry established by the UN Human Rights Council, which documents the
perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity. See Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Human Rights
Council, June 4, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (2013).
337. Thakur & Weiss, supra note 306, at 23.
338. Peters, supra note 73, at 189.
339. Christopher Joyner, “The Responsibility to Protect”: Humanitarian Concern and
the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 693, 720 (2007).
340. See e.g., Mohamed Ayoob, Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty, 6
INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 81, 84 (2002) (arguing that RtoP bears the features of the ‘standard
of civilization’ that provided a pretext for European colonization).
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only does RtoP-Realpolitik entrust the Security Council, which is
ultimately a Great Power oligarchy, with the authority to wage
humanitarian war, it also institutionalizes what Samantha Power,
a leading champion of humanitarianism and the current US
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, critically
dubbed as “a la cartism” in dealing with humanitarian crises.342
Regardless of the nature of the unfolding human tragedy,
nothing in RtoP-Realpolitik, as has been the case since the entry
into force of the UN Charter in 1945, requires international
intervention to prevent or halt mass atrocities.
If anything, RtoP-Realpolitik appears to be purposefully
designed to operate within the limits of the UN collective
security apparatus established in the aftermath of World War II.
Collective security, in its ideal form, obliges states to “abide by
certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when
necessary, band together to stop aggression.”343 In other words,
states participating in such a system view security as indivisible,
agree to consider threats or acts of aggression against any state
as aimed at all states, and make an a priori commitment to
unconditionally aid victims and subdue aggressors. In a sense,
therefore, under ideal collective security, the very definition of
security is transformed. Formerly antagonistic coequal
sovereigns perceive their individual security, and perhaps even
their survival, as intertwined with that of the collectivity, thereby
establishing what may be termed a genuine security
community.344

341. See: MICHAEL SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES 177 (2013) (discussing
the limited changes in the existing structure of jus ad bellum caused by the adoption of
RtoP.)
342. Samantha Power, Force Full, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2003), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/srebenica-liberalism-balkan-united%20nations
343. Charles Kupchan & Clifford Kupchan, The Promise of Collective Security, 20
INT’L SECURITY 52, 52–53 (1995).
344. The term ‘security community’ was first introduced by Karl Deutsch to
denote a situation where the security of states becomes so intertwined and
interdependent to the extent that these states feel assured that they will never be
subjected to attacks from other members of the community and that all disputes will be
peacefully settled. See KARL DEUTSCH ET AL., POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH
ATLANTIC AREA 3–6 (1957).
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The United Nations, however, was neither intended nor has
it functioned as an ideal collective security system.345 Rather, as
John Ruggie remarks, “the UN design may be described as a
concert placed within a collective security organization.”346
Unlike ideal collective security, a concert does not entail
binding commitments or codified obligations to protect victims
of aggression or vindicate legal rights. Furthermore, a concert
does not expunge power politics or competition among its
participants. In fact, it is driven by Great Powers and functions
on the basis of consensus between these most influential
players.347 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the sine qua non for the
successful operation of such an arrangement is the convergence
of the views and interests of the Great Powers, which, as the
historical record demonstrates, is a transient state of affairs.348
These differences between ideal collective security and the
concert-like UN security apparatus are comparable to the
disparities distinguishing RtoP-Humanity’s Version from RtoPRealpolitik detailed above. More fundamentally, the divergence
between, on one side, ideal collective security and RtoP-Humanity’s Version, and on the other side, Great Power concert
and RtoP-Realpolitik, are reflective of commitments to
contrasting worldviews and normative projects. While I do risk
painting these concepts with a rather broad brush, ideal
collective security and RtoP-Humanity’s Version, like global
constitutionalism and the humanitarian thesis, ultimately
operate on the foundation of a communitarian post-nation state
image of the world.349 Whenever the principal beneficiary of
security is identified as a collectivity beyond the state, be it a
region, the entire world, or humanity, or when it is argued that
345. Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the
United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 789 (1948) (concluding that “[t]he Charter is far
from fulfilling these requirements”).
346. John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT’L
ORG. 561, 587 (1992); see John Gerard Ruggie, The False Premise of Realism, 20 INT’L
SECURITY 62, 63 (1995) (describing how since its inception the United Nations was
imagined as “a collective security organization based in a concert of power, to be used
by, but not against, the permanent members of the Security Council”).
347. Charles Kupchan & Clifford Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security, and the
Future of Europe, 16 INT’L SECURITY 114, 120 (1991).
348. Ernst B. Haas, Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational
Concepts, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 40 (1955).
349. See supra notes 306–16 and accompanying text.
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the international legal system has evolved into a hierarchical
order predicated on humanitarian values, the impact of these
intellectual moves is to challenge the primacy of the sovereign
state as the leading actor in international affairs.
A security system based on a Great Power concert, however,
is “a means of enforcing order between independent political
communities [and] of achieving a degree of centralization that
does not radically threaten the independence and autonomy of states.”350
A concert, therefore, is a political arrangement that, like the law
of coexistence,351 seeks to minimize conflict and manage
relations between territorially disjoint, coequal sovereigns
inhabiting an insecure world. It achieves this purpose by
entrusting the most powerful states with special responsibilities
in administering inter-state relations and maintaining stability in
global politics. RtoP-Realpolitik is designed to operate within the
bounds of this Great Power concert.
These are the limits of RtoP, and indeed, of
humanitarianism in our contemporary world. Waging war to
protect civilians from mass atrocities, including crimes shocking
the conscious of humanity, remains subservient to and
dependent on the vagaries and uncertainties of Great Power
politics.
It appears, therefore, that the conscious choice made in
2005 to adopt RtoP-Realpolitik, despite the presence of numerous
alternatives, including RtoP-Humanity’s Version, casts doubts over
claims that international law, especially jus ad bellum, is
undergoing a systematic process of humanization whereby the
telos of the international legal order is becoming the promotion,
protection, and fulfillment of human security, rights, needs, and
interests. Nothing in RtoP-Realpolitik, and the Great Power
concert within which it functions, corroborates what proponents
of the humanitarian thesis depict as a revolution in the nature of
international law or a change in its deep structure.352 Rather, it
appears that the law of coexistence with its emphasis on
protecting state security and maintaining inter-state peace and

350. Andrew Hurrell, Collective Security and International Order Revisited, 11 INT’L
REL. 37, 41 (1992) (emphasis added).
351. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 340–50 and accompanying text.
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stability, as opposed to human security, continues to constitute
the underlying objectives and purposes of jus ad bellum.353
This conclusion should not, however, be read as suggesting
that the adoption of RtoP by the 2005 World Summit, even if in
attenuated form, was wholly inconsequential. Although RtoPRealpolitik neither establishes novel legal rights or obligations
nor challenges the fundamental features of the existing jus ad
bellum scheme, it does express an endorsement of the expansion
that occurred in the Security Council’s definition of threats to
and breaches of the peace.354 Since the early-1990s, the Security
Council repeatedly found that internal conflicts or domestic
strife, even if not causing regional repercussions, constitute
threats to or breaches of the peace that warrant authorizing
forceful intervention.355 The adoption of RtoP indicates that this
practice has become firmly established. It also demonstrates that
the protection of civilians from mass atrocities per se, regardless
of whether it entails transboundary ramifications or causes interstate tensions, has become recognized as a legitimate policy
objective to be pursued by the Security Council.356
Furthermore, since its adoption in 2005, RtoP has gradually
become streamlined into UN practice and discourse.357 This has
been propelled by repeated references to RtoP in Security
Council discussions and resolutions,358 the issuance by the
353. After undertaking a review of developments throughout the entire corpus of
international law, Bruno Simma notes that despite the undeniable shift of international
law from a minimalist law of coexistence towards community law, “[O]ne must not
forget that traditionally patterned, bilateralist international law still constitutes the basis
on which the new developments are taking shape—and a rather pertinacious basis at
that.” Simma, supra note 64, at 229–30.
354. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
355. Bruce Cronin, International Consensus and the Changing Legal Authority of the
UN Security Council, in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY 57 (Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., 2008).
356. Jon Western & Joshua S. Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age:
Lessons From Somalia to Libya, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 48, 54–55 (2011).
357. Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 ETHICS & INT’L
AFF. 143 (2010).
358. UN Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006) was the first to cite RtoP. In
addition, UN member states exchanged views on implementing RtoP during the
annual debates held by the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed
conflict. For excerpts of the positions expressed on RtoP during these debates, see
Security Council Debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, International Coalition
for the Responsibility to Protect (May 10, 2011), http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/
rtop-statements_docms-poc-may-2011.pdf.
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Secretary General of reports elaborating its scope, content, and
methods of operationalization,359 and the convening of General
Assembly debates on its implementation.360 This contributed to
the gradual transformation of RtoP from a relatively novel and
contentious concept into a recognized policy framework for
guiding UN responses to mass atrocities.361
The cumulative impact of this entrenchment of RtoP is
that, even if restricted to whatever course of action is politically
feasible within a Great Power concert, it has become harder for
the society of states to turn a blind eye to threatened or ongoing
atrocities. Although RtoP neither obliges nor guarantees either
forceful or even diplomatic intervention to protect civilians, it is
among the factors that contribute to generating a felt need and
creating palpable pressure both on the Great Powers and the
broader UN membership to take measures to protect civilians.362
The international reaction to the Libyan and Syrian civil
wars, although strikingly different, bears out the forgoing
observations about both the UN collective security apparatus
and RtoP-Realpolitik. In responding to both these crises, the
Security Council, in keeping with its purpose and design, acted
as a Great Power concert. Nothing in the Charter or in RtoP
obliged the Council to examine either of these conflicts or to
take any measures to protect civilians against mass atrocities.
Instead, whether these conflicts were brought before the
359. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued two reports outlining the various
aspects of RtoP and proposing approaches to implementing the concept. The first
report, issued in 2009, was U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). In 2010, the
Secretary General issued a follow-up report: U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning,
Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/64/864 (July 14, 2010).
360. The General Assembly held two debates on the aforementioned reports of
the Secretary General. As one observer noted, these debates indicated “a growing
political consensus in support of the Responsibility to Protect . . . states are willing to
accept the relatively minimalist construction of the Responsibility to Protect outlined in
the World Summit Outcome Document . . .” Burke-White, supra note 335, at 33.
361. Alex J. Bellamy, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the
Norm, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 263 (2011).
362. Simon Chesterman, “Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the
Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 279, 282
(2011) (arguing that “the true significance of RtoP is not in creating new rights or
obligations to do ‘the right thing’; rather, it is in making it harder to do to the wrong
thing or nothing at all”).
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Council and the nature of its response principally depended on
the positions of the P5. In addition, the glaring discrepancy
between the Council’s authorization of the use of force to
protect civilians in the Libyan case and its failure for over two
years to even pass a resolution censuring the Assad regime in
Syria is partially imputable to the choice made during the 2005
World Summit.363 By leaving the Council’s unlimited margin of
appreciation untouched and ensuring that the P5’s influence
remained unscathed, RtoP-Realpolitik effectively codified and
institutionalized the Council’s policy of pragmatic “ad hocism”364
in dealing with humanitarian crises. Waging war to prevent mass
human suffering, regardless of the egregiousness of the
atrocities, continues to hinge—as it has since 1945—on the
consent of the P5, and pursuing the humanitarian value of
saving lives continues to operate within the restrictive bounds of
the politically feasible in a world dominated by the Great
Powers.
Nonetheless, these crises also demonstrate the impact RtoP,
even in its severely mitigated form, has had on international
debates on the prevention of mass atrocities. Never during
deliberations held at the United Nations or elsewhere on the
Libyan or Syrian conflicts was the responsibility of governments
to prevent the perpetration of the most heinous crimes
questioned. In other words, this core commitment contained in
RtoP, which echoes broader customary obligations emanating
from human rights and humanitarian law,365 continues to enjoy
global support. Indeed, discussions principally centered on the
appropriate response of the international community to the
deteriorating situations in those two countries. In other words,
the debate has shifted from whether the international community
should do anything to prevent mass atrocities to what should be

363. I say partially because the strategic interests of the Great Powers undoubtedly
played the central role in determining the outcomes of Security Council deliberations
on Syria. It remains, however, that the fact that RtoP as adopted by the 2005 World
Summit stated that situations in which mass atrocities were being perpetrated would be
examined, essentially, “on a case-by-case basis.”
364. Andrea Bianchi, Ad-Hocism and the Rule of Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 263, 269–70
(2002).
365. Stahn, supra note 325, at 107.
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done.366 This shift is partially imputable to RtoP, which
contributed to structuring international debates on these
matters and excluded certain policy options, such as turning a
blind eye to ongoing atrocities, that had become untenable.
CONCLUSION
Speaking on her final day as US Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, Susan Rice criticized the Security Council
for failing to protect Syrian civilians and condemned the
Council’s inaction due to Russo-Chinese vetoes as “a moral and
strategic disgrace that history will judge harshly.”367 Whether the
Council’s posture towards the Syrian civil war constitutes a
“moral and strategic disgrace” is a subjective assessment which
readers may or may not agree with.
The assertion, however, that the Security Council failed is a
different matter. In this Article, I argued that the Security
Council was conceived and continues to operate as a Great
Power concert, not as an enforcer of either international law or
morality. Nothing in the UN Charter or elsewhere obliges the
Council to either deliberate on or authorize enforcement
measures in response to any situation that threatens world
peace, whether caused by an inter-state dispute or a domestic
crisis, and whatever its human toll. In the aftermath of NATO’s
intervention in Kosovo, however, an opportunity appeared to
revisit the doctrinal and institutional architecture governing the
use of force in international relations. A gap had opened
between the legality forged by the victorious Great Powers of
World War II and an emergent humanitarian legitimacy that
privileges universal human values. In a bid to bridge this gap,
RtoP-Humanity’s Version was advanced as a holistic policy
framework to guide international intervention to prevent mass
atrocities. If adopted, RtoP-Humanity’s Version would have
instituted considerable restraints both on the limitless
institutional discretion of the Security Council and the

366. Mohamed Helal & Philippe Kirsch, Case Studies: Libya, in THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming May 2014).
367. Susan E. Rice, Remarks at the Security Council Stakeout (June 25, 2013),
available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/211134.htm.
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unmatched influence of the P5 when confronted with grave
humanitarian crises.
More profoundly, had this bid to alter the doctrinal and
institutional components of jus ad bellum succeeded, it would
have portended a perceptible shift in the core values and
purposes of international law.368 Traditionally, international law
operated as a set of rules that facilitated the peaceful
coexistence of coequal sovereigns in an anarchic world order.
RtoP-Humanity’s Version, however, represented an attempt to
relegate the state, its interests, security, and survival to the
background, and prioritize human security, interests, and
welfare as the overarching purposes of international law.
Ultimately, however, a version of RtoP prevailed that left
the fundamental features of jus ad bellum intact. RtoP-Realpolitik,
as I have called the outcome of the 2005 World Summit,
represents a deliberate choice in favor of preserving the Security
Council’s broad margin of appreciation and making the
protection of civilians against the most egregious crimes
contingent on the consent of the P5. Indeed, humanitarian
crises are to be dealt with like any source of insecurity in the
world or any matter on the Council’s agenda, be it global
terrorism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Kashmir, HIV-AIDS in Africa,
territorial disputes, or the relatively mundane regular renewal of
UN peacekeeping operations. This means that RtoP-Realpolitik
reaffirmed the original understanding underlying the
establishment of the Security Council in 1945: that this political
body par excellence would maintain peace and security without
impinging on whatever the P5 perceive as constituting their vital
interests, thereby contributing to the continued peaceful
coexistence between these Great Powers.
Thus, it appears that, contrary to Ambassador Rice’s claim,
when it came to Syria, even if in a grotesquely perverted way, the
Security Council succeeded in executing its mandate. Russian
368. Martha Finnemore argued that “[h]ow force is used among members of a
society, by whom, and to what purpose reveal a great deal about the nature of authority
in the group and the ends that its members value.” MARTHA FINNEMORE, THE PURPOSE
OF INTERVENTION: CHANGING BELIEFS ABOUT THE USE OF FORCE 1 (2003). In other
words, the values underpinning jus ad bellum and the social purposes it pursues serve as
a seismograph of sorts for the values of the entire international legal order. Therefore,
a change in the values and purposes underlying jus ad bellum would certainly signify a
shift in the overarching telos of the international legal order.
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strategic interests in Syria were unharmed and any settlement to
the conflict remains dependent on Great Power agreement. This
challenges claims that jus ad bellum is undergoing a profound
process of humanization. The failure to overthrow the dominant
statist values of jus ad bellum and making the pursuit of
humanitarian objectives dependent on the uncertainties of
Great Power politics, casts doubts over the extent to which
humanitarianism is becoming recognized as the telos of this field
of international law. The fact that, when given the opportunity,
the international community consciously chose to reaffirm rules
and institutions that reflect statist values suggests that
humanitarian values are not progressively becoming the globally
dominant values. This also indicates that, contrary to accounts
proclaiming the rise of humanity’s law and the emergence of a
community of humankind governed by the rule of law, world
politics remains an anarchical realm of competitive, mutually
exclusive, self-regarding states, and that humanitarianism
functions within the limits of this highly politicized world.

